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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Plaintiffs Dr. and Mrs. Allen R. Grahn (herein also 
referred to as "Grahns") do not accept the Statement of the Case 
made by Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, for and on behalf 
Court of Appeals 
NO. 89-0340 CA 
Argument Priority No. 14(b) 
District Court No. C-86-8833 
Judge: John A. Rokich 
1 
of the Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family 
Trust (herein referred to as "Gregory" or "Defendant Trusts"). 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the following statement. 
In the Court below, Dr. and Mrs. Grahn sought relief 
from the Defendant Trusts and Dean and Christi Bradshaw, (herein 
referred to as "Defendants Bradshaw" or "Bradshaws"), seeking, 
inter alia, reformation of the legal description, in a deed to 
Plaintiff's real property, to include all of the Private Drive 
which had historically provided access to the home on their new 
estate. The Private Drive had been represented, intended and 
agreed to be situated thereon, but mistakenly was not included in 
the legal description. 
Plaintiffs also sought: to enjoin Defendants Bradshaw 
from fulfilling their threats to break ground on the Private 
Drive on that land; specific performance and enforcement of an 
easement for aesthetic protection of the land next to the Private 
Drive; to recover damages from Gregory and Bradshaws for alleged 
conspiracy and deceitful behavior to deprive Plaintiffs of their 
rights to that property; and an Order of Rescission of the sale 
of the adjacent parcel by Defendant Trusts to Defendants Bradshaw 
and, accordingly, the reinstatement of the Plaintiffs7 option and 
first right of refusal to purchase that adjacent property, plus 
damages, including attorneys fees, for breach of that option by 
2 
Defendant Trusts. Plaintiffs also sought relief from another 
Defendant, the surveyor, Mr. McNeil for his negligence in 
drafting the legal description. 
Defendant Trusts counterclaimed for rescission of the 
transaction between them and Plaintiffs, and brought a Crossclaim 
against Defendant McNeil for his negligence. Defendants Bradshaw 
counterclaimed for damages resulting from alleged wrongful 
injunction. 
A preliminary injunction was granted and, after a 
hearing, the injunction was made permanent pending trial. 
Motions were heard and ruled upon by the Court. The 
parties engaged discovery. There was a plenary trial on 
September 24, 25, 29 and 30, 1987, before the Honorable John A. 
Rokich. 
The Court below found that the written deed mistakenly 
varied from the agreement between Defendant Trusts and Grahns, 
and granted reformation of the deed. The Court also ordered 
Plaintiffs to pay for the quantity of land in the parcel, as 
reformed, which was in excess of 1.11 acres. The Court ordered 
that the reformed deed include the easement and that the 
transaction between Defendant Trustee and Defendants Bradshaw be 
rescinded. Plaintiffs failed to prove a conspiracy and, 
therefore, their claims based upon such deceit were dismissed. 
The Court awarded costs to Plaintiffs, but no attorneys7 fees. 
3 
The Court also found that McNeil had no duty to Grahns 
and therefore dismissed the Plaintiffs' claim based on negligence 
of the surveyor. The Court made no finding on the Gregory claim 
against McNeil. 
Defendant Trusts have appealed from the judgment of 
reformation of the deed. Defendant Trusts seek rescission of the 
transaction between Plaintiffs and Defendant Trusts. Defendants 
Bradshaw join in that appeal of the judgment of reformation and 
also appeal the denial of their claim for damages. Defendants 
Bradshaw have not appealed from the judgment of rescission of the 
transaction by which they would have purchased the adjacent 
property. 
Plaintiffs accept the decision in chief, but do use 
this opportunity to respectfully appeal from two particular parts 
of the decision. Plaintiffs submit that the evidence does not 
support the order to pay for the difference between the revised 
quantity measurement of land and that originally listed in a 
legal description. It is also submitted that the Court below 
should have awarded attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiffs are emphatically dissatisfied with the 
Statement of Facts presented by Defendant Trusts. 
Plaintiffs submit that the said Defendants Statement of 
Facts plays fast and loose with the actual facts, contains 
4 
numerous inaccuracies, twists of evidentiary material, and 
irrelevant information. The Defendants attempt to direct this 
Court's attention away from the testimony adduced at trial. In 
place of the evidence, Defendants rely upon an early stipulation 
which represented an attempt to describe the preliminary 
understandings of counsel as to the facts. That stipulation was 
submitted to the trial judge solely for the purposes of a hearing 
concerning injunctive relief, held within a month after the 
commencement of the action. 
Concerning the Stipulation, the facts are as follows. 
In December, 1986, shortly after the action was filed and a 
temporary restraining order was issued (Record: the Motion, pages 
20-27; Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause, pages 
28-31), a Stipulation of Facts ("Stipulation"), which was drafted 
by the attorneys for Defendant Trusts, was submitted 
" * * * to assist the Court and the parties to 
this stipulation in resolving the issues 
relating the outstanding Temporary Restraining 
Order and Plaintiffs' Pending Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction against Defendant 
Bradshaw continued for hearing on December 15, 
1986. For purposes of said hearing, the 
parties represent that they believe the 
following facts to be true and that the Court 
can accept the following facts as true in 
determining the issues now before the Court." 
(Record: Stipulation of Facts, pages 40-41.) 
[Emphasis supplied] 
Without the benefit of discovery or investigation into the facts, 
the parties stipulated as to what the facts might be, solely for 
5 
purposes of considering the injunction. The Court, in its Order 
granting the injunction, acknowledged the limited purpose for the 
Stipulation. (Record: page 88) . 
It is important to note that lengthy discovery and fact 
analysis took place after that Stipulation was submitted, and, 
further, that all issues were tried below. The Stipulation was 
not used to limit the scope of evidence presented at the trial; 
nor was any attempt made to publish or introduce the Stipulation 
as evidence. It was not used at all, after that early hearing. 
In fact, at trial, most of the "facts11 once stipulated to for 
purposes of that injunction hearing were disproved, qualified by 
additional facts, or exposed as significantly incomplete, 
inaccurate or misstated. 
Despite these developments which culminated in a 
plenary trial on the issues, Defendants rely on that preliminary 
Stipulation for purposes of their appeal. Due to their heavy 
reliance thereon, the Defendants' Statement of Facts creates a 
misleading picture of the case which was actually considered by 
the Trial Court. 
Because of the confusion thus created by the Brief of 
Defendant Trusts, it is important to this Court's consideration 
of this Appeal that an extraordinary effort be made to clear the 
air and to present a straight-forward, accurate statement of the 
relevant facts. In Addendum I, Facts, Plaintiffs have, 
6 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Respondents cite no such determinative laws. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
In addition to those issues identified in the Briefs of 
Appellants, Respondents present the following issues: 
1. Did the Trial Court err when it ruled that Grahns 
should be required to pay Gregory for the quantity over 1.11 
acres in Parcel 1 land after the reformation of the deed? 
2. Should the Court have awarded Grahns attorneys' 
fees? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
There were two distinct mistakes made by the parties in 
this matter; 1) a mutual mistake in the legal description in the 
property purchased by Grahns from Defendant Trusts, and 2) a 
unilateral mistake by the Trustee of Defendant Trusts as to the 
effect of the Grahn sale upon them. 
Both parties intended that Grahns receive certain land, 
including the Private Drive, but the deed's description varied, 
by mistake, from that intent. Reformation of the deed is both 
equitably and legally appropriate. 
6(a) 
Rescission, on the other hand, is not appropriate^ 
Gregory did not promptly and unequivocally elect rescission upon 
discovery of the mistake. Further by the standards set for 
rescission by Utah case law (whether for unilateral or mutual 
mistake), rescission was not available as a remedy under the 
facts and circumstances. 
Contrary to the argument of Gregory, the provisions of 
the agreement between two parties is not merged into a final deed 
if it is mistaken. This principle is the very essence of the 
equity remedy of reformation. 
It is well settled Utah law that the main objective of 
a court in construing a deed is to determine the intent of the 
parties from the language used in the deed. In the case at bar, 
the intention of the parties, as demonstrated in the contract, 
the legal descriptions and other evidence, was clearly that the 
Private Drive was to have been included within the boundaries of 
the land sold to the Grahns. 
Defendants Bradshaw did not appeal the Order of the 
Trial Court which rescinded their purchase of Parcel Two from 
Gregory. As such, Bradshaws have no property interest and no 
cause of action for the relief which they seek on appeal. 
In any event, as a result of the Bradshaws' actual 
notice, and knowledge of the mistake in th€> deed description 
prior to their closing, Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers 
6(b) 
and could not cut off Grahns' right of reformation. Furthermore, 
the evidence showed that Bradshaws never had an enforceable 
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories and could not have 
been damaged by the preliminary injunction granted by the Trial 
Court. The evidence showed that the injunction was proper in 
every respect. 
Reformation of the deed to Parcel One provided Grahns 
the exact property as intended by the parties to the sale. The 
price was not based on acreage, but was for that parcel. The 
parties clearly intended the entire amount of land in Parcel One 
(including the Private Drive) to be sold for the original 
purchase price as agreed and there should have been no award for 
additional compensation for the final acreage reflected as a 
result of the reformation of the legal description. 
The Defendant Trusts, in closing the sale of Parcel Two 
to the Bradshaws upon different terms and conditions than offered 
to the Grahns under their option agreement, breached said option 
agreement and, as such, should be responsible to Grahns for 
attorneys' fees, as provided in their contract. The Trial Court 
erred in failing to award Grahns attorneys' fees in connection 
with that breach. 
6(c) 
therefore, identified the misstated and disproved "facts11 which 
were alleged, anew, on this Appeal. Plaintiffs elect to 
affirmatively submit, below, the facts as they were adduced 
before the Trial Court. The Addendum and the Plaintiffs 
Statement of Facts are both important to an understanding of the 
issues. Without that information, the Court of Appeals could be 
misled into considering a case much different than that 
considered by the trial judge. 
Grahns respectfully solicit the indulgence of the 
Justices of the Court of Appeals in the extraordinary length of 
this Statement of Facts. It is only by this method that a clear 
starting point can be created. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. FOUNDATION. 
a. Defendant Trusts, owners of the real property 
which made up the estate at 2811 Brookburn Road, entered into a 
listing agreement with broker Noel Taylor for the sale of the 
property. (Transcript: Noel Taylor, page 4, lines 6-13; page 
26, lines 9-10, lines 21-25; Mrs. Gregory page 154, lines 6-21.) 
b. In 1984, a surveyor, Mr. McNeil, was hired to 
assist in an effort to divide from the Brookburn estate an 
approximate half (1/2) acre parcel to be deeded to Barbara 
Danielson, a beneficiary of the Defendant Trusts. (Transcript: 
7 
Mrs. Gregory, page 156, lines 4-13; Danielson, page 419, lines 
11-25 — please note: the transcript mistakenly identifies the 
year as 1964, rather than 1984,) 
c. Mr. McNeil was instructed by Barbeira Danielson, 
with the knowledge and cooperation of trustee Gregory, to provide 
a topographic survey of the Brookburn estate sufficient to enable 
them to locate the existing house. He was also directed to divide 
off a half (1/2) acre parcel in the "southeast corner".- He was 
told to locate and stake such a parcel (referring to the Private 
Drive as "the road", 
" * * * to the south and east off the road, 
use the road as the boundary." (Transcript: 
McNeil, page 222, lines 7-21, quoting lines 20 
and 21. See also page 228, lines 14-17; 229, 
lines 19-20; page 235, lines 16-22; Danielson, 
page 419, lines 2-8; Mrs. Gregory, page 
156-157) 
The resultant survey was introduced into evidence as Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "1". (Transcript: McNeil, page 221; Mrs. Gregory, page 
156.) 
d. There were no contingency instructions, because 
there was no question that a half (1/2) acre parcel could be 
divided from the estate using the southeast side of the driveway 
as a boundary. (Transcript, page 246, lines 8-18; page 475, 
lines 20-24.) 
8 
2. THE MISTAKE. 
a. When Mr. McNeil prepared the legal description 
which he set forth on that survey (Exhibit 1-P) , he intended to 
describe a parcel of land situated on the east side of the 
Private Drive, with its edge as the boundary, approximately 
one-half (1/2) acre in size. (Transcript: page 475, lines 9-18) 
Q. [By Mr. Adams] When she first hired you 
she instructed you, did she not, to see if 
there was a buildable lot on the east side of 
the driveway? 
A. [By Mr. McNeil] She instructed us to 
survey off a half-acre parcel on the east side 
of the driveway. 
(Transcript: page 475, lines 4-8. See also Danielson, page 420, 
lines 12-17.) 
b. In preparing the description, Mr. McNeil and his 
crew made a four (4) degree error at the point of describing the 
turn where the Brookburn Road intersects the Private Drive. 
(Transcript: McNeil, page 224, lines 17-21, and pages 224-228 for 
testimony describing the error with reference to Exhibit 1-P and 
marks made thereon.) 
c. The effect of the error is that the legal 
description to that new, undeveloped parcel made a call to the 
easterly side of the existing Private Drive (Transcript page 463, 
lines 14-25), but identified the incorrect number of feet to that 
9 
call, missing by fifteen (15) feet at that point,. (Transcript 
page 454, lines 9-22; subsequent pages indicating mathematical 
ramifications of error.) 
3. SELLING THE PROPERTY, 
a. The property was listed by Gregory on behalf of 
the Defendant Trusts, with Noel Taylor. (It had been conveyed to 
Barbara Danielson, and then re-conveyed back to the Defendant 
Trusts. Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 157, lines 10-16; 
Danielson, pages 429-420.) Mr. Gregory was the trustee but Mrs. 
Gregory communicated on behalf of the sellers as well. They 
informed Mr. Taylor that, although the property was listed as a 
single parcel, since it had been divided, either parcel could be 
purchased. He was directed and authorized to advise potential 
buyers that the survey stakes placed along the east side of the 
driveway would indicate the boundary between the two parcels and 
to assure any buyer of the larger parcel that the Private Drive 
was to go with it, to provide access to the house. (Transcript: 
N. Taylor, pages 4-5; page 6, lines 12-22; page 8, lines 18-22; 
page 13, lines 3-12; page 33, lines 8-20; page 34, lines 12-14. 
Mrs. Gregory, page 155, lines 22-25.) 
"* * * and we all understood that the property 
would be sold to whomever; if they couldn't 
buy the entire property, it would be as 
staked." (Transcript: N. Taylor, page 34, 
lines 12-14.) 
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b. At trial, the larger parcel, with the residence 
situated on it was identified as Parcel One, The smaller parcel, 
on the south and east side, was identified as Parcel Two, 
(Transcript: Court, page 60, lines 8-10.) 
c. The Grahns were exposed to the property and 
contacted Noel Taylor in regard to it. (Transcript: N. Taylor, 
pages 5-6.) 
4. REPRESENTATIONS. 
a. Noel Taylor showed the property to the Grahns, and 
advised them that one of the two parcels could be purchased, and 
identified for them the boundaries of the property. (Transcript: 
N. Taylor, page 6, lines 4-21; Mrs. Grahn, pages 56-57.) Despite 
snowy conditions of the property, Noel Taylor uncovered survey 
stakes on the south and east side of the driveway to demonstrate 
and represent that boundary line. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 
57, lines 5-9.) 
b. Representations were made to the Grahns to show 
them the other physical boundaries, including the fence and 
river. (Transcript: N. Taylor, page 8, lines 2-4. Mrs. Grahn, 
page 140, lines 8-9.) 
c. The Grahns sought assurances in regard to the 
physical boundaries of the land on numerous occasions, from Noel 
Taylor as well as Gregory, and discussed the details in regard 
thereto. In fact, Noel Taylor testified that the Grahns 
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» * * * were very explicit on making sure they 
did purchase the roadway, because they did not 
want to detract from the beauty of the 
property. From that standpoint we did, on 
several occasions, walk the entire perimeters 
of the property * * * . tf (Quoted language, 
Noel Taylor, page 7, line 25, page 8, lines 
1-4; 
See also Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 161, lines 11-19; page 
162, lines 10-13; Mrs. Grahn, pages 85-86.) 
d. Mrs. Gregory even informed Mrs. Grahn that she had 
had prior experiences involving problems with ownership of a 
driveway, and assured Mrs. Grahn that the driveway was to be 
owned by the owner of Parcel One, and to serve as access to that 
parcel. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 85, lines 2 3-25, page 86, 
lines 1-3; Mrs. Gregory, page 162, lines 14-21.) 
5. INTENTIONS/AGREEMENT. 
a. Even prior to the sale to the Grahns, Barbara 
Danielson intended to build on Parcel Two, but leave the driveway 
to the residence to the owner of Parcel One. (Transcript: Noel 
Taylor, page 5, lines 16-20.) 
b. The Grahns, in submitting an Earnest Money 
Agreement to purchase Parcel One, intended that the driveway be 
included therein. (Transcript: N. Taylor, page 51, line 25, page 
52, and page 53, lines 1-2; Mrs. Grahn, page 61, lines 18-23; 
page 62, lines 2-24; Mr. Grahn, page 395, lines 8-11.) 
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c. Gregory also intended that the Private Drive be 
sold to the Grahns as part of Parcel One. (Transcript: Mr. 
Gregory, page 301, lines 5-9; 354, lines 4-15; Mrs. Gregory, page 
162, lines 10-12.) 
d. The Grahns were not concerned about the size of 
either Parcel One or Parcel Two, but were concerned with the 
physical boundaries which had been agreed to. (Transcript: Mr. 
Grahn, page 395, lines 8-15; Mrs. Grahn, page 58, lines 1-8; page 
140, lines 8-15; Exhibit 2-P. See also testimony of N. Taylor, 
especially pages 5-10, and 31-34, which indicates that, due to 
the unique nature of the property, concern about measurable 
quantity, rather than physical boundaries, would have been 
unusual.) 
e. The Grahns submitted on March 18, 1986, and 
Gregory later accepted and executed an earnest money agreement. 
The earnest money agreement was entered into evidence as Exhibit 
"2-P11. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 61, lines 1-10.) 
6. SOURCE OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION. 
a. As her attorney prepared a proposed draft of an 
earnest money agreement for the Grahns, Mrs. Grahn sought to find 
a legal description of Parcel One to attach to the earnest money 
agreement form. She called Mrs. Gregory for one, and was advised 
that the description could be found on the tax notice. Rather 
than drive to the Gregory home for a copy of the tax notice, 
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since she was at that time in downtown Salt Lake City, Mrs. Grahn 
visited the Salt Lake County offices, and was directed to the 
Salt Lake County Recorder's Office where she obtained a copy of 
the legal description, (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 83-84.) 
b. The Salt Lake County Recorder, apparently, used 
the legal description from the Danielson deed for Parcel Two as a 
basis for forming a legal description for Parcel One. This was 
the source of the legal description which Mrs. Grahn picked up. 
(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 343, lines 8-13; Mrs. Grahn, 
pages 83-84.) 
c. Mr. McNeil testified that the Grahn legal 
description, as a result of the mistake and the €>fforts by the 
Recorder without knowledge of the mistake, was difficult to 
follow. In fact, to a surveyor, he testified, it is clear that 
the description is mistaken in what it conveys. (Transcript: 
McNeil, pages 458, lines 8-20; and 478, lines 19-25.) 
7. DOCUMENTATION. 
a. The Earnest Money Sales Agreement, referred to 
above, stated that ingress and egress to the property was made by 
a private easement, which the parties understood as a reference 
to the Private Drive. (Transcript: N. Taylor, pages 12-13; Mrs. 
Grahn, page 61, lines 11-25, page 62, line 1.) 
14 
b. The earnest money agreement, referred to above, 
provided for an easement for an aesthetic break between the 
properties as well as geologic protection against erosion, which 
easement would extend into Parcel Two 
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 * * * from any point within fifteen (15) 
feet of the existing drive which separates the 
two lots, * * * ." (Transcript: N. Taylor, 
page 52, lines 12-14; Exhibit 2-P, Exhibit A, 
page 4.) 
c. The Grahns and Gregory closed on the purchase and 
sale of Parcel One on or about August 1, 1986. (Transcript: 
Mrs. Grahn, page 63, lines 23-25, page 64, line 1.) 
8. DISCOVERY OF THE MISTAKE. 
a. Having entered into an Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement to purchase Parcel Two with Gregory, Defendant Dean 
Bradshaw discovered evidence which led to the discovery of the 
mistake on October 11, 1986. He advised Gregory and McNeil of 
his discovery and, thereupon, McNeil discovered the mistake. 
(Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 169-172; Mr. Gregory, pages 
312-313; McNeil, page 224, lines 6-21.) 
b. McNeil advised Bradshaws and Gregory of the affect 
of the mistake. (Transcript: McNeil, pages 229-230.) He had 
made a four degree error in turning a corner in the survey. 
Although the description accurately identified the arc of the 
Private Drive, due to the mistaken angular measurement, it failed 
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to accurately identify the southeast side of that drive, as had 
been intended. (Transcript: McNeil pages 227, lines 15-16; 245, 
lines 9-19; 453-454, lines 20-25, 1-22; 477, lines 16-22.) 
c. Within two days of the discovery, McNeil submitted 
to Gregory a new survey which would reform the description to 
fulfill the instructions which he had been given* This survey 
identified a half (1/2) acre lot on the south and east side of 
the Private Drive, using the Private Drive as one of the 
boundaries. (Transcript: McNeil, page 229, lines 14-25; page 
476, lines 1-9; Mr. Gregory, page 316, lines 18-25, page 317, 
lines 1-4.) This survey was received into evidence as Exhibit 
lf12-P". (Transcript, page 173.) 
d. Dissatisfied with that suggestion, Gregory and 
Bradshaws sought a drawing showing the effect of the description 
of Parcel Two without regard to the Private Drive. (Transcript: 
McNeil, page 230-231; Mr. Gregory, page 317, lines 5-23, page 
318, lines 20-25.) This drawing was received as Exhibit "9-P". 
(Transcript, page 75) 
9. SUPPRESSION OF MISTAKE. 
a. Grahns, on October 11, 1986, became aware of 
additional survey work around the Private Drive on their 
property. Within a couple of days they saw circles drawn by 
surveyors on the driveway. They therefore telephoned Gregorys to 
inquire as to the meaning. They were finally able to make 
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contact on the Thursday following October 11, 1986. Herold 
Gregory, when questioned, refrained from advising Mrs. Grahn of 
the discovery which had been made on October 11, or the 
information which he had gained since that date, and instead 
explained the stakes and circles as an effort to reseat stakes 
which had been pulled up by children and then further reassured 
her not to worry, because the Grahns still owned the driveway. 
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.) 
b. Despite their discovery of the mistake and its 
effect of making the prior survey (Exhibit fll-Plf) unreliable, 
Gregory and Bradshaws did not advise Salt Lake County that the 
survey which they had submitted in connection with an application 
for lot approval was incorrect, or that there was the potential 
for a dispute concerning the driveway which served Parcel One. 
To the time of trial, the county had not been advised in that 
regard. (Transcript: Reynolds, page 249, lines 14-22; pages 
268-269.) 
10. BRADSHAW PURCHASE OF PARCEL 2. 
a. Bradshaws were very familiar with the real 
property at Brookburn in that they had been looking at it even 
before the Grahns first visit, had returned to consider it 
frequently, and had thought about it a great deal by the time the 
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Grahns purchased the property on August 1, 1986. (Transcript: N. 
Taylor, pages 13-14; Mr. Bradshaw, page 213, lines 11-13; page 
400, lines 14-15; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 364, lines 17-24.) 
b. Bradshaws had been advised, as had other potential 
buyers, that the south and east side of the Private Drive served 
as the boundary between the two parcels. (Transcript: N. Taylor, 
page 14, lines 6-11; page 42, lines 23-25; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 
390, lines 4-9.) 
c. Bradshaws had been advised and were aware that the 
Grahns had purchased the improved portion of the property 
including the home thereon, and that they believed that they were 
the owners of the Private Drive. Bradshaws were further aware of 
the easement in favor of the Grahns along the south and east side 
of the Private Drive. (Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 214, lines 
4-23; Mrs. Gregory, page 184, lines 24-25, page 18 5, lines 1-12; 
Mrs. Bradshaw, page 367, lines 17-19; page 374, lines 14-17, page 
385, line 9; and pages 388-389.) 
d. Bradshaws, on or about October 11, 1986, became 
aware of the mistake in the survey and legal description which 
had been made by McNeil, and during the next few days, learned of 
its ramifications. Accordingly, Bradshaws were aware of the 
problem for more than forty days before their closing with 
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Gregory, and before the Grahns were made aware of the same. 
(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 312-313; Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, 
lines 14-17.) 
e. On November 20, 1986, the Bradshaws and Defendant 
Trusts closed their agreement to purchase and sell Parcel Two 
according to the legal description as originally, mistakenly 
written by McNeil. (Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 215, lines 
1-4.) 
f. At that time, Bradshaws and Gregory also entered 
into a side agreement, labeled Exhibit lf13-Pfl and introduced into 
evidence at trial, which acknowledged a mistake and potential 
dispute in regard to the property line between Parcel One and 
Parcel Two, and provided, further that: 
"In the event that buyer cannot obtain the 
full .56 acre according to the legal 
description, seller agrees to nullify sale and 
refund purchase price." (Quotation cited: 
Mary Ethel Gregory reading from the exhibit, 
page 179, lines 2-4.) 
(Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179, lines 12-25, 1-11, page 
196, lines 16-22; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 384, lines 4-13; 387, lines 
15-25.) 
g. Prior to closing, but after discovery of the 
mistake, Gregory had provided Bradshaws numerous opportunities to 
back out of their agreement to purchase Parcel Two. Bradshaws 
had in each case declined. (Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 399, 
lines 18-22; page 407, lines 2-8.) 
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11. DISCLOSURE OF THE MISTAKE. 
a. On Friday, November 21, 1986, (after closing with 
Bradshaws) Gregory met with Grahns to advise them of the mistake. 
Gregory advised them that they could pick one of two options: 
rescission or to allow Gregory to construct a new driveway on a 
different part of Parcel One. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 
73-76; Exhibit 8-P; Mr. Gregory, page 323.) 
b. Grahns were shown McNeil's drawing (Exhibit "9-P") 
which would indicate how the mistaken description of Parcel Two 
would cross the Private Drive, but were not advised of or shown 
McNeil's proposed survey to correct the problem, reforming the 
property lines consistent with his directions, which survey was 
Exhibit lf12-Pff. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 75-76.) 
c. Grahns asked for time to consider that of which 
they had just been informed. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 
76-77; Mr. Gregory, page 323, lines 20-21.) 
12. THE THREAT. 
a. On Friday, November 21st, the Grahns were pressed 
by Mr. Bradshaw; and then during the evening of Sunday, November 
2 3rd, had a conversation with Mr. Bradshaw during which he 
indicated his intent to break ground immediately, implying that 
he would do so on their driveway, and also advising them of his 
unwillingness to wait for them to consider their alternatives. 
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 77-79.) 
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b. Mr. Bradshaw advised them that, if they desired to 
stop him, they would have to seek an order of the court, 
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 78, lines 18-25, page 79, line 1; 
see also pages 134-135.) 
13. THE LAWSUIT. 
a. Seeing no alternative, Plaintiffs sought to file 
suit on Monday, November 24, and also sought a temporary 
restraining order. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 79, lines 
11-15; Record pages 2-32.) 
14. THE OPTION. 
a. In connection with their purchase of the property 
from Defendant Trusts, Grahns obtained an Option to 
Purchase/First Right of Refusal in regard to Parcel Two. Among 
other things, the Option provided that, should Grahns fail to 
exercise their right after an opportunity, and 
"should the offer be amended making the terms 
more favorable * * * then the said amendment 
or offer shall be, once again, subject to the 
terms of this provision.11 (Transcript: Mrs. 
Gregory, page 210, lines 2-15; Mrs. Grahn, 
page 63, lines 1-12; N. Taylor, page 7, lines 
20-24.) 
b. After entering into an Earnest Money Agreement 
with Bradshaws, Gregory extended an option opportunity to Grahns, 
which the Grahns declined to accept because they could not 
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perform within the two (2) week period which the Earnest Money 
Agreement called for. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 67-68; 
Exhibit 7-P; Mrs. Gregory, pages 165-166.) 
c. The Bradshaws did not close within that two (2) 
week period, but, by agreement or understanding between Bradshaws 
and Gregory, extended their rights to close at a later date. 
Gregory did not offer to the Grahns a new opportunity to close at 
a later date. (Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 166, lines 2-19; 
Mrs. Grahn, page 87, lines 2-9.) 
d. The terms of the opportunity did not describe land 
which crossed the Private Drive, nor provide that the Side 
Agreement referred to above would be part of the arrangement for 
the purchase of Parcel Two. The Grahns were not extended a new 
opportunity to purchase under those terms. (Transcript: Mrs. 
Gregory, pages 178-179; Mrs. Grahn, page 87, lines 10-21.) 
OTHER FACTS THE COURT SHOULD NOTE 
In addition to the key facts and evidence identified 
above, with citations to the record and transcript, there was 
certain evidence of which this Court should be advised. It is 
especially true in this case that a full reading of the 
transcript will place the Justices of this Court in a position to 
consider the legal arguments which relate to the contest between 
the parties primarily concerning the issue of reformation. 
Certain evidence was adduced before the Court which relates to 
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those key issues, the existence of which should be made familiar 
to the Court. They are identified, succinctly, below with 
citations to the transcript and record. 
15. Gregory was intimately familiar with both parcels 
of the property in question. (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 
287-288; Danielson, pages 415-417.) 
16. Bradshaws were very familiar with the property by 
the time they submitted their Earnest Money proposal. 
(Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, page 213, lines 3-13; Mrs. Bradshaw, 
page 364, lines 17-24; Mr. Bradshaw, page 400, lines 10-17; N. 
Taylor, pages 13-14.) 
17. Parcel Two (after reformation) is a buildable lot. 
(Transcript: McNeil, page 476, lines 6-9; Reynolds, page 251, 
lines 24-25, page 252, lines 1-8; page 264-265; McNeil, 242-243.) 
18. The Grahns cannot be placed in the status quo, if 
rescission was to be considered. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 
64-65.) 
19. The Court visited the property. (Transcript: page 
81, lines 3-11.) 
20. By the surveyor's analysis, using the legal 
descriptions for Parcels One and Two, and without reformation, 
there may very well have been a "no-man's land" between the 
parcels which included part of the Private Drive. (Transcript: 
McNeil, page 465, lines 13-17.) 
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BRADSHAWS' FACTS 
(Grahns do not accept the additional facts, as alleged 
by Bradshaws in their Brief, and offer the following in 
qualifications thereto.) 
21. Defendant Bradshaws failed to enter into an 
enforceable agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories. 
(Transcript: Mr. Ostler, pages 493-497.) 
22. Bradshaws did not obtain a building permit to 
commence construction. (Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, pages 406-407, 
lines 19-25.) 
23. Contrary to the allegation in paragraph 48, page 5 
of Bradshaws' Brief, Mr. Ostler did not testify as indicated. In 
fact, he testified that he never figured out how much concrete or 
aggregate would be needed (transcript: page 490, line 2) or 
arrived at a price (page 490, lines 9-18), and that he would have 
needed cooperation from a cement company, but had not come to an 




TWO DISTINCT MISTAKES WERE MADE BY THE PARTIES; 
a. a mutual mistake in the legal description of 
the property purchased by Grahns from Defendant Trusts, and 
b. a unilateral mistake by the Defendant Trusts 
as to the effect of the agreement upon them. 
Despite the positioning and posturing in the Brief of 
Defendants, the evidence adduced before the Trial Court revealed 
two separate, distinct mistakes. One mistake was mutual, as 
between Grahns and Gregory. The other was a unilateral mistake 
made by Gregory. 
THE MUTUAL MISTAKE concerned the legal description. 
Grahns and Gregory agreed that the Private Driveway on the 
property was to be conveyed to the Grahns as a part of Parcel 
One. All parties understood at closing that the driveway was 
part of that which was being bought and sold. It was never 
intended otherwise. (See Statements of Fact and citations to the 
Transcript, above.) All of the following was established by 
clear and convincing evidence, and in fact was uncontroverted: 
1. Parcels One and Two were created from a 
single parcel, which was divided before Grahns entered the 
picture. (Transcript: testimony of Noel Taylor, pages 
4-5.) 
2. Mr. McNeil prepared a survey of Parcel Two, 
with a legal description, and survey stakes were placed on 
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the property, especially along the south and eastern side of 
the Private Drive, to indicate the location of the boundary 
line between the parcels. (Transcript: testimony of McNeil, 
pages 221-222.) 
3. The listing agent for Gregory was instructed 
after the creation of the survey to advise potential buyers 
as to the option that one or the other of the parcels could 
be purchased, and of the boundary between them. Noel 
Taylor, the agent, testified that 
" * * *
 w e all understood that the 
property would be sold to whomever; if 
they couldn't buy the entire property, it 
would be as staked." * 
(Transcript: testimony of Taylor, page 8, lines 19-22, page 
28, lines 1-2; and page 34, lines 1-5, lines 12-14 — 
*quoted above. See also testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page 
155-156, lines 16-25, 1-3; and testimony of Barbara 
Danielson, page 241, lines 23-25.) 
4. Grahns were shown the stakes along the south 
and eastern side of the driveway and were told of the 
boundaries by Noel Taylor and by Gregory on separate 
occasions. (Transcript: testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages 
56-57; of Noel Taylor, page 6, lines 10-22; Mrs. Gregory, 
page 161, lines 11-14.) 
5. Mrs. Grahn had seen an overhead photo of the 
property in the county offices indicating the boundaries of 
the lot which they intended to purchase, which were the same 
as the stakes. (Transcript: testimony of Mrs. Grahn, page 
141, lines 20-25.) 
6. The Grahns carefully sought information in 
regard to the boundaries, and made clear their intention and 
desire that the driveway was part of Parcel One. Noel 
Taylor testified that the Grahns 
" * * * were very explicit on making sure 
they did purchase the roadway, because 
they did not want to detract from the 
beauty of the property. From that 
standpoint we did, on several occasions, 
walk the entire perimeters of the 
property * * * ." (Transcript: 
testimony of Noel Taylor, pages 7-8, 
lines 25, 1-4.) 
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7. In the Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 
n2-Plf, the parties referred to access to the residence 
by a Private Easement, intending that the reference be 
to the Private Drive. (Transcript: testimony of Mrs. 
Grahn, page 61, lines 11-23; Noel Taylor, page 50, lines 
6-8.) 
8. Also in the Earnest Money Agreement, the 
parties referred to the Private Drive as the boundary 
between Parcel One and Parcel Two in connection with 
describing an easement to be granted along the Private 
Drive on the side of Parcel Two. (Transcript: 
testimony of Noel Taylor, pages 51-53; Mrs. Grahn, page 
62, lines 8-24.) 
9. Gregory believed that the Private 
Driveway was part of Parcel One, and represented the 
same to be true. (Transcript: testimony of Mr. 
Gregory, page 354, lines 4-15; Noel Taylor, page 5, 
lines 7-15; Mrs. Gregory, page 162, lines 6-21.) 
10. Gregory intended to sell the driveway as 
part of Parcel One. (Transcript: testimony of Mr. 
Gregory, pages 300-301, lines 25, 1-9.) 
11. Gregory even gratuitously represented to 
the Grahns, after closing, that the Grahns, as owners of 
Parcel One, owned the driveway. (Remark made in 
response to October 11, 1986, inquiry by Grahns as to 
meaning of new surveyor markings.) (Transcript: 
testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.) Further, when 
finally disclosing the discovery of the mistake to 
Grahns, on November 21, 1986, Gregory acknowledged that 
they had thought the Private Drive to be part of Grahn's 
property. (Transcript: testimony of Mr. Gregory, page 
323, lines 13-14.) 
The legal description used by Grahns and Gregory at 
closing was mistaken. (Transcript: Testimony of McNeil, page 
224, lines 17-21, pages 224-228.) The description had apparently 
been drawn by a Salt Lake County employee from Mr. McNeil's legal 
description of Parcel Two, which had appeared on the deed from 
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the Defendant Trusts to Barbara Danielson. (Transcript: 
testimony of Mr. Gregory, page 343, lines 12-13,) As indicated 
by Mr. McNeil, (Transcript: page 458, lines 8-20; 478, lines 
19-25) it was not clear what the legal description described, but 
it was clearly mistaken. The legal description accurately 
refers to the arc of the Private Drive, but due to the mistaken 
angular measurement, fails to accurately identify the existing 
south and east side of the Private Drive, as was intended. 
There is no doubt that both Grahns and Gregory 
intended, at the time that they respectively purchased and sold 
the property, that Parcel One would contain the Private Drive 
which had historically served as a means of access to the 
residence on the property. 
[The Justices of this Court are respectfully urged to 
take notice of the fact that the property in question is very 
unique property in the Salt Lake Valley. A thoughtful review of 
the surveys in the record will help in creating that 
appreciation, but only a little. It was important that the trial 
judge visited the property. The property, itself, thereby became 
evidence. (Transcript: page 81, lines 3-11.) The Private Drive 
is a long, winding drive through a steep, thickly vegetated 
terrain to an old estate home nestled next to a stream.] 
THE UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
Q. [Mr. Woodbury] So, this was the original 
survey you had on the property; is that 
correct? 
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A. [Mr. Gregory] Correct 
Q. And this was the survey that you were 
relying on when you gave the instruction to 
Mr. Taylor to divide the property, to offer 
the property to be divided; is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And is it my understanding from your 
previous testimony that if you would have 
known that this was not correct, you wouldn't 
have given him that instruction? Is that 
correct? 
A. We never would have divided it. 
(Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 316, lines 
5-17.) 
The Gregorys each testified that it was their belief 
that Parcel Two, as it was situated on the southeast side of the 
Private Drive, contained a quantity of land equal to or greater 
than one-half (1/2) acre. (Transcript: Testimony of Mr. 
Gregory, page 300, lines 11-12; testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page 
209, lines 1-10; pages 156-157.) That was the direction which 
was given to Mr. McNeil, the surveyor. (See Statement of Facts, 
No. 2.a., above.) In fact, however, Parcel Two contained 
slightly less than one-half (1/2) of an acre as determined 
according to the intention of the parties and/or the call to the 
Private Drive as the boundary. It was estimated by Mr. McNeil 
that Parcel Two, under those circumstances, would have five 
one-hundredths (5/100) of an acre less than a full half (1/2) 
acre. (Transcript: Mr. McNeil, page 460, lines 15-16.) 
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The concern of Gregory in the quantity of land related 
to its "buildability". (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 300, lines 
11-17.) The minimum size for a building lot in that zone of the 
county was one-half (1/2) an acre, except with a variance. 
(Transcript: Reynolds, page 249, line 19.) 
In relation to this issue, the Gregorys testified that 
they would not have divided the land into two parcels had they 
learned that they could not place a half (1/2) acre parcel on the 
south and eastern side of the Private Drive. (Transcript: 
Testimony of Mr. Gregory, page 301, lines 17-21; testimony of 
Mrs. Gregory, page 18 5, lines 2 2-24.) It is important to note, 
however, that there is no evidence that a half acre lot could not 
be placed thereon; and that there is no evidence that Gregorys 
would have crossed the Private Drive under those circumstances to 
create a one-half acre parcel. As to the latter point, Mrs. 
Gregory testified, instead, that it was their desire to keep the 
driveway as part of Parcel One. (Transcript: Testimony of Mrs. 
Gregory, page 162, lines 6-21; see also page 183, lines 5-8.) 
On the other hand, the Grahns did not concern 
themselves with the size of Parcel Two. They were not concerned 
with the quantity of land even in Parcel One. (See Statement of 
Facts 5.d., hereinabove.) There was no evidence that the 
quantity of land in Parcel Two was an issue in the negotiations, 
understanding or agreement between Gregorys and Grahns in regard 
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to the purchase and sale of Parcel One. Gregorys did not bargain 
with Grahns in regard to the split of the land; they offered it 
to the Grahns as an already divided parcel, and showed the Grahns 
the boundaries which it was to have, according to its legal 
description. 
It is also clear from a reading of the record, that the 
mistaken belief of the Gregorys concerned not the specific 
quantity of the land, but, instead, that one be able to build a 
home upon Parcel 2. They concluded in part by strict reference 
to the zoning requirement that, with less than half (1/2) an 
acre, it was not buildable. However, the testimony before the 
Court was that, with a variance, the lot would be just as 
buildable (it was the same size) as it had been before it was 
determined that the quantity of land was slightly less than half 
(1/2) an acre. (See Statement of Facts 17.) A steeply sloped 
parcel next to the Private Drive (see Exhibit "1", Topographical 
Survey for a rough representation); the more level portion of 
Parcel 2 was that portion of the property furthest away from the 
Private Drive, on the south and east side of the parcel. Both 
Warren Reynolds, Chief Senior Planner of the Planning and Zoning 
Board of Salt Lake County, and Mr. McNeil, the surveyor, 
testified as to their belief that the remaining property, as is, 
was buildable. 
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It is clear, then, that the Gregorys incorrectly 
concluded that the lot was not buildable because of their focus 
upon the Bradshaw plans for a house, which would not fit on the 
property. 
About a week later - - well, I explained to 
them what the problem was and as best I could, 
and about a week later they came back and 
said, "This won't do. This doesn't help us. 
Now Bradshaw's house does not fit on the 
property." 
(Transcript: McNeil, page 230, lines 1-5.) 
Bradshaw planned a three-story mansion, including cin attic, with 
sixteen hundred (1,600) square feet on each floor, rectangular in 
shape, one side of which would reach all the way to the Private 
Drive. (Transcript: Mr. Bradshaw, pages 405-406, lines 24-25, 
1-7, significantly supplemented by pages 413-414, lines 12-25, 
1-7.) 
It is submitted that a cooperative alliance in this 
litigation was formed between Gregorys and Bradshaws, in 
opposition to the Grahns, and that that alliance has apparently 
blindly been kept. The Defendant's attorneys have worked closely 
together, as was apparent at trial and continues to be apparent 
in the presentation of briefs. The attorneys for the Defendants 
are members of the same law firm. The Gregorys believed, and may 
still believe, that they had a deal with Bradshaws upon which 
they were bound to perform. (Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, page 17 6, 
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lines 4-6.) There is no evidence in the transcript to indicate 
that the Gregorys understood that they could get out of that 
deal. 
It is submitted, respectfully, that, in regard to the 
unilateral mistake of the Gregorys, and despite their arguments, 
this is not a case of impracticality or impossibility of 
performance of their part of a bargain. There is no evidence of 
grave consequence as a result of their perceived, unilateral 
mistake as to the buildability of Parcel Two. Except for 
testimony in regard to the effect upon the Bradshaw plans, and 
their expressions of frustration as to their conclusion, that it 
was unbuildable, there is no evidence to support Gregorys 
position. 
II 
REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS AN APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE REMEDY 
Plaintiffs Grahn sought, and were awarded reformation 
of the deed to conform with the intention of the parties that 
Parcel One include the Private Drive. The Gregorys sought, and 
on appeal, continue to seek, an order instead to rescind the 
transaction as between Grahns and Gregorys. It is therefore 
helpful to look to the authorities on the equitable remedies to 
distinguish between the two. 
George L. Clark, in his Treatise, EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1954, at p. 370, stated: 
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If, on account of a mistake common to both 
parties to a bilateral transaction the written 
instrument does not express the true agreement 
of the parties, equity will generally correct 
the instrument so as to conform to the actual 
bargain. Perhaps the most common instance is 
that of a conveyance which, beceiuse of a 
mistake of the scrivener not discovered by 
either party, describes too much or too little 
property, * * * . 
At page 408 of that Treatise, in a section entitled "Rescission 
Distinguished From Reformation", Clark further stated, 
The main distinction between reformation and 
rescission, as has already been pointed out, 
is that reformation is an affirmance of the 
bargain as it was actually made, while 
rescission is a disaffirmance of the bargain 
itself. In order that reformation may be 
given there must have been a previous 
agreement which the court may use as a 
standard for the correction of the erroneous 
instrument; in order that there be rescission 
such previous agreement is not only 
unnecessary but its existence would ordinarily 
prevent rescission. [Emphasis added] 
See also Re, Edward D. , Cases and Materials on REMEDIES, The 
Foundation Press, Inc., 1982, p. 478, quoting Hermann, 
"Reformation and Rescission," 1960 U. 111. L.F.I, 44 (1960): 
The basic distinction between reformation and 
rescission is "clear and well defined; the 
reformation of a contract involves an effort 
to enforce as reformed, whereas rescission 
involves an effort to abandon and recede from 
a contract which the other party had not 
intended to make." 
As was demonstrated in point I, above, there was a 
meeting of minds as to what was to be conveyed to the Grahns by 
the Defendant Trusts. Grahns submit that the purpose of the 
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remedy known as reformation is to provide relief in circumstances 
such as theirs. The law in Utah clearly allows for such a 
remedy. Justice Zimmerman, of the Utah Supreme Court, in the 
case of Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985), at page 772, 
said: 
A contract may be reformed for either of two 
reasons. First, if the instrument does not 
embody the intentions of both parties to the 
contract, a mutual mistake has occurred, and 
reformation is appropriate. Second, if one 
party is laboring under a mistake about a 
contract term and that mistake either has been 
induced by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's 
conduct will have the same operable effect as 
a mistake, and reformation is permissible. 
(Citation omitted) 
Both reasons apply to the instant case. See also Naisbett v. 
Hodges, 307 P.2d 620 (Utah 1957), Peterson v. Eldredge, 246 P.2d 
886 (Utah 1952), and Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1984) . 
In Hottinger v. Jensen, Ibid., at 1273, the court 
examined circumstances very similar to those before this Court 
and determined that reformation was appropriate. The court 
stated: 
This case is a clear case of mutual mistake by 
the parties. The defendant and all subsequent 
purchasers except plaintiffs agreed that the 
understanding and the intent of the parties to 
the various deeds was that the fence line be 
the boundary. It was only due to a mistake 
made by the drafter of the deed as to the 
metes and bounds description that the deed did 
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not conform to the intent of the parties. 
Reformation is clearly appropriate where there 
is a variance between the written deed and the 
true agreement of the parties caused by a 
draftsman. 
Based upon the foregoing, reformation is clearly an appropriate 
remedy under the circumstances. (Although not raised by Gregorys 
in their brief, the Bradshaws have claimed that they were bona 
fide purchasers of Parcel Two and, by that fact, blocked 
Plaintiffs' claim of reformation. Hottinger also ciddresses this 
standard, and applies directly to the facts in this matter, to 
establish that Bradshaws were not bona fide purchasers. 
Reformation was, therefore, avciilable. See page 1273.) 
Had there been no mistake in the legal description 
which was used by Grahns and Gregory, performance, as agreed, 
would have been complete. If, under those circumstances, the 
Gregorys had refused to perform at closing, Grahns would have 
been entitled to relief in the form of specific performance of 
the agreement set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase Agreement. (Exhibit. "1-P") Gregory would have been 
bound by the agreement to sell the land, including the Private 
Drive, to the Grahns, without regard to the suggested negative 
effect upon them. The Grahns would be entitled to specific 
performance because the agreement had been made, the intent was 
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clear, and the Grahns would have had no adequate remedy at law. 
It is submitted that the remedies of specific performance and 
reformation are strongly related. 
It is clear from the testimony of all witnesses with 
knowledge of prior events (and especially from the Earnest Money 
Agreement with typed Addendum in which the Private Drive is 
specifically referred to as the boundary) that Gregory intended 
to sell to the Grahns the estate identified as Parcel One and 
that that estate would include the Private Drive. Only the legal 
description which was mistakenly used has drawn question to 
whether that intent was fulfilled. 
The Trial Court should be upheld in its ruling that the 
deed be reformed to provide that the Private Drive be included in 
Parcel One. 
Ill 
THE REMEDY OP RESCISSION OF THE SALE OP PARCEL ONE 
TO THE GRAHNS IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
(Response to arguments I and III 
submitted by Gregory in Appellant's Brief.) 
A. The Defendant Trusts did not elect rescission, act 
promptly and unequivocally announce their intention to rescind; 
but instead ratified the transaction, and cannot now claim 
otherwise. 
A prerequisite to a claim for rescission is that the 
party seeking rescission must elect to rescind, must act promptly 
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in doing so after discovery of the reason for its claim that it 
is entitled to rescission, and must unequivocally announce that 
intention. See Perry v. Woodall, 438 P.2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968). 
The Gregorys waited forty-one (41) days, from October 
11, 1986, to November 21, 1986, to advise the Plaintiffs of the 
mistake. The letter which was delivered to them (Exhibit f,8-Pf!) 
did not constitute a tender of rescission or election of 
rescission. It did offer rescission as one alternative solution. 
The letter, further, was not unequivocal in its announcement. On 
receipt, the Grahns sought, but were not allowed an opportunity 
to analyze the situation. Instead they were pressed to decide, 
even before the next business day. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, 
pages 76-79.) 
Further, nothing in the letter from Gregory or in the 
evidence before the Court indicated an ability of the Defendant 
Trusts to repay the Plaintiffs. Nothing in the notice or in the 
testimony would indicate how Gregory would have proposed (or now 
proposes) to place the Grahns in the status quo immediately prior 
to the purchase of the property. (See argument in Section III. 
B.4., below.) 
Finally, even if Gregory had a right to rescission, any 
such right was waived and/or is barred by the principle of 
estoppel. Due to the Gregorys' actions, the Defendant Trusts 
were barred from seeking such equitable relief. The 
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uncontroverted evidence before the Trial Court was that five (5) 
to six (6) days after the mistake was discovered, and a few days 
after Defendant McNeil had explained the effect of this mistake 
to Defendants Bradshaw and Trusts, in response to direct 
questions by Mrs. Grahn concerning the meaning of survey markings 
on their property, Gregory concealed the facts and affirmatively 
volunteered to Mrs. Grahn that the Grahns "still owned the 
driveway." (Transcript: Testimony of Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.) 
Having made that misrepresentation and effectively duped the 
Grahns into believing that no further inquiry was necessary, the 
Gregorys then waited another thirty-five (35) days to advise the 
Grahns to the contrary. During that period of time, Gregorys 
dealt with Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning (but did not 
disclose the new facts to them, either). They then arranged to 
close the sale to the Bradshaws — but only by quit claim deed as 
to the Private Drive (Exhibit 13-P, page 2, numbered paragraph 2) 
and with an agreement effectively allowing for rescission should 
they be unable to deliver the land under and across the Private 
Drive to Bradshaws. (Transcript: Mrs. Gregory, pages 178-179; 
Exhibit "13-P".) 
Considering such behavior, Williston on Contracts, 
Third Edition, Volume 13, 1970, § 1557, p. 98-9, states: 
However, the courts are in substantial accord 
that any rights the injured party may have by 
way of disavowal, disaffirmance or rescission 
must be asserted and exercised in a timely 
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manner or they will be deemed waived or lost. 
For this purpose, mistake is often assimilated 
to fraud: 
"Where a party desires to rescind upon the 
grounds of mistcike or fraud, he must, upon the 
discovery of the facts, at once announce his 
purpose, and adhere to it. If he be silent 
and continue to treat the property as his own, 
he will be held to have waived the objection 
and will be conclusively bound by the 
contract, as if the mistake or fraud had not 
occurred. He is not permitted to play fast 
and loose. Delay and vacillation are fatal to 
the right which had before subsisted." 
[Citation omitted] 
And where after a mistake is discovered, a 
party continues to carry out his part of the 
bargain without notifying the other party of 
any intent to rescind or disaffirm the 
agreement within a reasonable time, it will be 
deemed a subsisting and binding obligation. * 
* * 
In conclusion, it is noteworthy, as the courts 
have frequently pointed out, that the 
intention to disaffirm the agreement, or, for 
that matter to waive the right to terminate, 
or rescind, may be manifested not only by 
verbal expressions, written or oral, but by 
conduct as well. (Citations omitted.) 
Similarly, Clark, in his Treatise, EQUITY, supra, at 
page 424, succinctly states: 
If the plaintiff after learning of the mistake 
has expressly or by his conduct ratified the 
transaction, it is then too late to ask for 
rescission. 
B. Defendant Trusts did not satisfy the elements 
which must be established in order to obtain equitable relief of 
rescission due to a unilateral mistake. 
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As noted by the Gregorys in their Appellant's Brief, 
the standard in Utah in regard to rescission based upon a 
unilateral mistake has been referred to in Briggs v. Liddell, 699 
P. 2d 770 (Utah 1985) wherein, at page 773, the court stated: 
* * * Under proper circumstances, rescission 
is available as a remedy for a unilateral 
mistake of fact. We have outlined the 
following [elements that must be established 
in order to obtain such relief]: 
(1) The mistake must be of so grave 
a consequence that to enforce the contract as 
actually made would be unconscionable. 
(2) The matter as to which the 
mistake was made must relate to a material 
feature of the contract. 
(3) Generally the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of 
ordinary diligence by the party making the 
mistake. 
(4) It must be possible to give 
relief by way of rescission without serious 
prejudice to the other party except the loss 
of his bargain. In other words it must be 
possible to put him in statu quo. 
[Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.] At trial, the Gregorys 
failed to carry their burden to establish those points. If any 
one of the elements is not satisfied, rescission would be 
inappropriate. Grahns submit that, based upon the evidence 
adduced at trial, the Trial Court correctly refused to grant 
rescission. None of the elements was satisfied. 
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In Del Porto v. Nicolo, 495 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1972), 
the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged a party's assertion that the 
court may review the evidence and determine facts, and stated: 
* * * However, in the practical application of 
that rule it is well established in our 
decisional law that due to the advantaged 
position of the Trial Court, in close 
proximity to the parties and the witnesses, 
there is indulged a presumption of correctness 
of his findings and judgment, with the burden 
upon the appellcint to show they were in error; 
and where the evidence is in conflict, we do 
not upset his findings merely because we may 
have reviewed the matter differently, but do 
so only if evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. (Citations omitted.) 
1. Element (1): The mistake must be of so grave a 
consequence that to enforce the contract as actually made would 
be unconscionable. 
As demonstrated in point I, above, Gregory failed to 
establish that the consequence of the failure to leave a full 
half (1/2) acre on the other side of the Private Drive would be 
unconscionable. The remaining lot (Parcel Two) is not useless. 
As also demonstrated above, the Gregorys concluded that the lot 
could not be built upon because it was slightly less in size than 
the minimum required lot in that zone, and because the Bradshaws 
could not fit their "dream11 house on the property. 
Knowledgeable, impartial and expert testimony, however, differed. 
Warren Reynolds, Senior Planner in charge of subdivisions, at 
Salt Lake County, testified as follows: 
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Q. [by Mr. Adams] In the event that this 
parcel which we refer to in the trial as 
Parcel No. 2 -- that is what was represented 
as approximately .56 acres. If that turned 
out to be less than half an acre, would it be 
appropriate to file for a variance from the 
straight application of the lot requirements? 
A. Yes. This would require a variance by 
the Board of Adjustment, because the zone 
requires half-acre lots, and that's what we 
worked towards and approved as the Eccles 
non-reg subdivision. 
Q. Has any such variance been filed, to your 
knowledge? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
(Transcript: page 251, lines 24-25, page 252, lines 1-11.) 
Later, under cross-examination, having been asked questions by 
Mr. Woodbury concerning whether Parcel Two was buildable, Mr. 
Reynolds answered: 
A. The Planning Commission was very 
concerned with the building of this — of 
putting a building on this lot because it has 
a slope of nearly seventy (70%) percent, and 
there was real concern. That's why it took a 
lot of time to be assured that there was a 
buildable site on this proposed lot and that 
it would be something that would be — meet 
the health, safety and welfare which we are 
charged to do. 
Q. So, this was a very, very steep lot? 
A. Very steep. 
Q. Very steep. Now if this lot were to be 
narrowed significantly, lets say take twenty 
(20) feet minimally off the property, would 
that increase your concern with respect to the 
buildability of that lot? 
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A. You pointed to the west boundary, to that 
twenty (20) feet off that boundary. Probably 
not. 
(Transcript: page 264, lines 4-18.) 
Mr. McNeil, a professional engineer and surveyor with 
years of experience (Transcript: pages 220-221) answered 
questions concerning Parcel Two, with a boundary along the south 
and east side of the existing driveway, as indicated in the 
revised survey (Exhibit ,f12-P!!) . Although the easement granted 
by Gregory to Grahns was a fifteen (15) foot easement, Mr. Walker 
asked Mr. McNeil: 
Q. In your opinion, let me ask you, if you 
had a 2 5-foot ecisement, what could you do with 
that remaining piece? Could you build on it, 
in your opinion, as a surveyor? 
A. I think you could build up in that 
southeast corner. 
Q. Are you familiar with the zoning 
requirements for the county for building in 
this, on this piece of property? 
A. I'm familicir with that. 
(Transcript: page 241, lines 17-25, page 242, line 1) . 
Mr. Walker continued his cross-examination to establish 
hypothetical setbacks according to a hypothetical variance and 
continued to assume a 25-foot easement. Even under those 
circumstances, and mindful of the topography of the hill on the 
lot, Mr. McNeil testified that it would be feasible to build on 
that site. (Transcript: pages 242-243) 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court could 
reasonably conclude, based upon this evidence, that Parcel Two 
was usable even after reformation. A variance could be sought, 
and, it is submitted, would certainly be favorably considered 
where the size of the property is so close to that which is 
technically required by zone for development. No evidence to the 
contrary was submitted. The Defendants did not place into 
evidence either testimony or other proof of an application for a 
variance or denial. 
Finally, the property, for years, had been part of the 
main parcel. There was no evidence before the Court that 
continued use as part of another, adjoining parcel, was out of 
the question. The Justices of this Court are respectfully 
reminded that the Trial Judge made a formal visit to the property 
to view it. It is submitted that he would have seen an area of 
large estates on a uniquely wooded, aesthetically pleasing, but 
uneven terrain. A visitor could easily have determined that use 
as a building site or undeveloped ground was a use which may be 
attractive to others, nonetheless. It would therefore not be 
unconscionable to enforce the parties7 agreement, even if the 
measured quantity of land in Parcel 2 was slightly below one-half 
acre. 
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Treatment of the issue of unconscionability necessarily 
includes an analysis of the* circumstances under which the 
mistake, as to the amount of land left over, was made. 
"Absent fraud, duress, mistake or the like 
attributable to the grantee, a competent 
grantor will not be permitted to attack or 
impeach his own deed.11 (Citation omitted) 
Barlow Soc v. Commercial Security Bank, 723 P.2d 393 (Utah 1986), 
at 4 01. The Utah Supreme Court has also noted: 
* * * that the parties to a real estate 
transaction do not deal on equal terms. An 
owner is presumed to know the boundaries of 
his own land, the quantity of his acreage, and 
the amount of water available. If he does not 
know the correct information, he must find out 
or refrain from making representations to 
unsuspecting strangers. "Even honesty in 
making a mistake is no defense as it is 
incumbent upon the vendor to know the facts." 
(Citations omitted) 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), at 1246. Although the 
Gregorys may have honestly made a mistake in regard to the effect 
of the survey upon them, in equity, they should not now be 
allowed to use that mistake to claim that the effect was 
unconscionable. 
See also Williston on Contracts, supra, § 1557, page 
2440, wherein the point is stated in this way: 
When is rescission available as a remedy? 
Where reformation is possible, it is generally 
the only remedy permissible, since the mistake 
of the parties related to their expression 
only, and to decree rescission and freedom 
from all obligation would be a clear violation 
of their intent. (Citing) Bollinger v. 
Central Pa. Quarry Strip. & Construction 
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Company, 425 Pa. 430, 229 A.2d 741; affirming 
decree of reformation it was stated: "Once a 
person enters into a written agreement he 
builds around himself a stone wall, from which 
he cannot escape by merely asserting he had 
not understood what he was signing. However, 
equity would completely fail in its objective 
if it refused to break a hole through the wall 
when it finds, after proper evidence, that 
there was a mistake between the parties, that 
it was real and not feigned, actual and not 
hypothetical." (Emphasis supplied: other 
citations omitted) 
2. Element (2): The matter as to which the mistake 
was made must relate to a material feature of the contract. 
Gregory also failed to establish and meet his burden of 
proof with respect to the second element. The contract in 
question is that between the Grahns and Gregory. There is no 
evidence that the Grahns and Gregorys concerned themselves, as 
between them, with the size of Parcel 2. In fact, the Grahns 
testified that they were not concerned about the quantity of 
land in Parcel 1. (See Statement of Facts 5.d., and citations to 
the transcript.) The testimony in those regards was 
uncontradicted. Therefore, the only evidentiary basis upon which 
the Trial Court could consider materiality would have been the 
testimony of the Gregorys that the size of Parcel 2 was a 
material feature in their own division of the parcels. They made 
a mistake in making that division. 
In the sale of Parcel 1 to the Grahns, the agreement to 
buy and sell was clear and, but for the mistaken legal 
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description, was documented by the parties. The Gregorys did 
not intend, in making that sale, to reserve a certain quantity of 
land. They did not negotiate with the Grahns in regard to how 
the land would be divided. Rather, they presented certain land 
to the Grahns with certain visually identifiable boundaries, and 
intended to convey that land to the Grahns. 
Grahns respectfully submit that, to rule otherwise 
would establish a precedent which might allow parties to avoid 
their own contracts where they can later claim, and emotionally 
argue, that the contract in question should be avoided because 
they made a "mistake" in their decision to enter into the 
contract. Corbin on Contracts (1952 edition) § 608, page 560 
addresses the issue more clearly: 
It must be borne in mind, however, that the 
circumstances accompanying the mistake must 
always be considered, just as they were 
considered by the former courts of Chancery. 
It has never been asserted, and it is not 
being asserted here, that a party ever makes 
out a sufficient case for relief, either 
affirmative or defensive, by merely proving 
that he was caused to execute a deed or to 
make a promise by the fact that he had a 
mistaken thought. * * * Here are two of the 
more important factors: Did the other party 
participate either intentionally or innocently 
in causing the mistake? Is it still possible 
to restore the other party to his original 
position? (Citations omitted) 
In the Defendant Trusts7 Brief on page 40, they cite 
California law to support their claim that they need not have 
articulated their mistake. Schultz v. County of Contra Costa, 
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203 Cal Rptr. 760, 765 (Cal. App. First Dist. 1984). There, a 
buyer purchased a lot from the government at a tax sale for the 
purpose of building a house on it. He looked at the lot, the 
surrounding developed lots, and the plat. He inquired regarding 
the lot with the government officials and others, but was not 
told that it was not large enough to build on. The government's 
tax assessment valuation was consistent with a small building 
lot. After the purchase, the tax valuation was reduced to less 
than one quarter of that value because the lot could not be used. 
Considering rescission, the split court affirmed the ruling of 
the court below, implying in its statements that the government 
should have known what the buyer would be thinking. There, the 
government may have innocently led Schultz to his mistake. The 
belief thus formed was clearly material to the buyer's offer to 
pay that price. 
The case at bar is to be distinguished from Schultz. 
The unarticulated, erroneous belief of the Gregorys was not 
material to their agreement with the Grahns. 
3. Element (3): Generally, the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by 
the party making the mistake. 
Gregory argues, at page 4 0 of Appellant's Brief, that 
he exercised ordinary diligence regarding the subdivision of the 
property. Gregory attempts to switch mistakes for the purpose of 
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making this argument. It is not at all clear that Gregory 
exercised ordinary diligence in connection with the unilateral 
mistake. 
Diligence involves active, vigilant care. Plaintiffs 
submit that a diligent party in the position of Gregory would 
have taken different action once the mistake in the legal 
description was discovered. Gregory did not advise Grahns 
(before the sale to Bradshaws some forty days later) of the 
mistake or its effect on the Trust's plans. Gregory did not open 
a dialogue in hopes that a solution could be worked out. 
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated, instead, 
that Gregorys refused to accept the suggestion of Mr. McNeil to 
reform the descriptions to accomplish the initial purpose: to 
place a half-acre parcel on the south and east side of the 
Private Drive. This was true despite the fact that Mr. McNeil 
demonstrated that it could be done. (See Statement of Facts 
8.c.) Knowing that it would complicate the problem (see Exhibit 
13-P) Gregory secretively closed his sale to Bradshaws, and then 
suggested to Grahns that the die was cast, and only two 
unattractive alternatives could be considered. (See Statement of 
Facts 9, 10, and 11.) 
The evidence adduced at trial showed no attempt to 
obtain a variance. No expert opinion was offered in regard to 
the claim of Gregory that the lot could not be built upon. No 
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evidence was introduced to indicate that Gregory had made an 
attempt to sell the lot to any party other than Bradshaws (who 
clearly had plans which did not work with Parcel 2) . It is 
submitted that these sorts of activity would have demonstrated 
ordinary diligence. Gregory was not diligent. 
4, Element (4): It must be possible to give relief by 
way of rescission without serious prejudice to the other party 
except the loss of his bargain. In other words it must be 
possible to put him in statu quo. 
No evidence was introduced at trial to support the 
proposition that Grahns could be placed in status quo. In 
Appellant's Brief, Gregory argues, simply, that damages could be 
awarded to the Grahns. 
However, the evidence at trial indicated that Grahns 
had sold their prior home (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 116-117); 
had put at least Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars of 
improvements into the property (Transcript: Testimony of Mrs. 
Grahn, pages 65-66, lines 24-25, 1-3); and, most importantly, had 
put over one thousand six hundred hours of their time into the 
property, making it livable and, essentially, their own 
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, page 65, lines 5-23). The money was 
spent on parts and materials which were used by the Grahns, 
primarily, in fixing the property. The Grahns had essentially 
invested themselves, time, heart and soul, into this unique real 
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estate and the improvements thereon. From this evidence, the 
Trial Court could easily have concluded, and probably did, that 
the Grahns would be seriously prejudiced if rescission were 
granted to defendant Trusts. On the evidence before it, it is 
unimaginable that the Trial Court could have concluded otherwise. 
As to each of the four elements, therefore, the 
defendant Trusts failed to carry their burden of proof. If only 
one of the elements was not proven, rescission would not be 
appropriate under the standard applicable to unilateral 
contracts. The Trial Court properly refused to order rescission. 
C. The elements of rescission upon a mutual mistake 
were not established at trial. 
In Appellant's Brief, defendant Trusts push, twist and 
turn their version of the facts in an attempt to make it fit the 
law of rescission, in the same manner that the Ugly Sisters, in 
the story of Cinderella, attempted to fit their feet into the 
glass slipper. The result is a confusing, frustrating argument 
when read by one who is familiar with the true facts. 
The true facts, as adduced at trial have therefore been 
very carefully identified and documented in this Brief. Further, 
the fact that two separate mistakes were made has carefully been 
revealed, and documented. 
In Point I of the Argument of Appellant's Brief, 
Gregory argues, in essence, that a mutual mistake was made by he 
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and the Grahns as to a basic assumption. That mutual mistake, 
Gregory alleges, was that Grahns intended to purchase 1.11 acres, 
apparently without regard to boundaries; and the parties intended 
that Parcel 2 would have .56 acres within it. (See pages 20 and 
22 of Appellant's Brief.) Yet, as the argument unfolds, Gregory 
was unable to establish that there was any evidence of that 
factual theory. 
Clearly, the trial judge did not find a mutual mistake 
such as that argued by defendant Trusts. This court is bound to 
presume the correctness of his findings and judgment. It is 
Gregory's burden to show that those findings and judgment were in 
error. Those findings and judgment cannot be upset unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates against them. See Del Porto v. 
Nicolo, supra; which was reaffirmed in Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 
P.2d 9, 11 (Utah 1982) - a case cited by Gregory on page 19 of 
Appellant's Brief, but which has no relation to the point for 
which it is used as authority. 
As demonstrated in Statement of Facts 5.d., above, and 
in foregoing argument, there is no evidence that the size of 
Parcel 1 was an issue between Grahns and Gregory. In fact, the 
evidence is that the Grahns did not care about the quantified 
size, only the boundaries. Further, it was clear that the Grahns 
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did not participate in the survey, but instead believed 
representations made to them, and which in turn, formed a basis 
for the meeting of the minds between Grahns and Gregory. 
Defendant Gregory goes so far as to submit, on page 2 2 
of Appellant's Brief, that the agreement between Grahns and 
Gregory was to transfer Parcel 1, according to its legal 
description. (Incidentally, the record indicated that it was not 
clear as to what land was described in that legal description, 
even to a surveyor. Transcript, Testimony of McNeil, pages 4 58, 
lines 8-20; 478, lines 19-25)., It is then argued in that Brief 
that Gregory intended to transfer the parcel as described. [It 
is hereby submitted on behalf of Grahns that if this Gregory 
allegation was true, it would, when combined with the 
representations clearly established at trial (Statement of Facts, 
4.) demonstrate that the Defendant Trusts, through their Trustee 
representatives, defrauded Grahns.] However, in the very next 
sentence, Gregory's argument twists, again, toward an attempt to 
describe a mutual mistake. Again, it is not supported by any 
evidence which was adduced before the court. 
Clearly, the defendant Trusts failed to establish, with 
evidence at trial, the elements of rescission based upon a mutual 
mistake. There was no mutual mistake of the sort argued by 
Gregory as to a basic assumption upon which the contract was 
made. Rather, as demonstrated above, in Respondent's Argument 
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II, the parties came to a meeting of minds as to their exchange 
of performances, but did not accomplish that performance as they 
expected, due to a mistaken legal description. 
The cases cited by Defendant Trusts in an attempt to 
establish the standard (page 19 of Appellant's Brief) failed to 
establish that Utah courts have adopted that standard and, 
further, have no relation to the case at bar. In fact, two of 
the cases cited (Kiahtipes and Tanner) do not even allude to the 
alleged standard. 
On pages 30 through 35 of Appellant's Brief, a detailed 
analysis of each of the claimed elements is presented. For the 
sake of argument, and without admitting that the standard is 
applicable, the following additional responses are offered by 
Grahns. 
I. Basic Assumption. As indicated above, Gregory's 
argument is that the sizes of the parcels were basic assumptions 
of the contract between Grahns and Gregory. As has already been 
clearly argued and documented, there is no evidence to support 
that conclusion. So, instead, Gregory's argument suggests the 
possibility that Grahns anticipated that another person could buy 
the adjacent lot, and then attempts to turn that suggested 
anticipation, of something which may happen in the future, into a 
"basic assumption". (See page 30, Appellant's Brief). 
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Gregory's argument even attempts to convince this Court 
that the portion of Parcel 2 which is contiguous with Parcel 1 is 
more level than the other portions of Parcel 2. This is simply 
not true. (See Exhibit 1-P; Transcript: N. Taylor, page 9, 
lines 5-8; Reynolds, page 264, lines 4-12.) 
Gregory alleges that Illustration 2, from RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §152, is "directly on point with the 
instant case". In its simplicity, the Illustration has some 
interesting similarities. It is easily distinguished from the 
case at bar, however. First, and foremost, the Grahns and 
Defendant Trusts, through their representatives, discussed and 
reached an understanding in regard to the actual boundaries of 
the land. Acreage was not an issue among them. Further, and, 
very importantly, the error by the surveyor was not in 
computation of acreage, as it was in the Illustration. 
This is a basic point of confusion for Defendant 
Trusts. Grahns submit, and the evidence adduced at trial clearly 
establishes, that Parcel 1 was always the same size, as defined 
by the physical boundaries which were walked by the Grahns and 
identified for them. The surveyor's mistake was in describing 
the location of the boundary line. 
Even if it was established that the Grahns7 acceptance 
of certain information given to them formed "an assumption", and 
that they therefore shared such "assumption" with Gregory, the 
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defendant Trusts are not entitled to avoid the contract. Such a 
result would be unconscionable. The Restatement of Contracts, 
2nd# §152, Comment a, page 386, explains: 
The mere fact that both parties are mistaken 
with respect to such an assumption does not, 
of itself, afford a reason for avoidance of 
the contract by the adversely affected party. 
Relief is only appropriate in situations where 
a mistake of both parties has such a material 
effect on the agreed exchange of performances 
as to upset the very basis for the contract. 
II. Material Effect * * * . The argument of Gregory 
in Appellant's Brief (page 32) does not establish material 
effect. It cites no evidence upon which the court could consider 
Gregory's plea that this court overturn the judgment of the trial 
judge. The argument can only rely upon the unilateral mistake, 
described and dealt with elsewhere in this Brief. 
III. Bearing the Risk * * *. Even if the Court were 
to accept the argument that a mutual mistake was made as to a 
basic assumption which had a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances between Grahns and Gregory in their 
agreement to buy and sell Parcel 1, Gregory must lose according 
to the standard argued in the Appellant's Brief. Certainly, 
under no stretch of the imagination, could it be said that Grahns 
bore the risk of the mutual mistake which Gregory argues was 
made. 
A seller of real property is presumed to know the 
boundaries of his own land and the quantity of his acreage. See 
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Sorensen v. Adams, 571 P.2d 764 (Idaho 1977). Also, see Dugan 
v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246-1247 (Utah 1980), where the Utah 
Supreme Court quoted, as authority, that presumption, and stated 
further that 
* * * A vendee of real property, in the 
absence of acts putting him on notice, has no 
duty to investigate to determine whether the 
vendor has misrepresented the area conveyed, 
(Citations omitted) 
That the seller often takes the risk is acknowledged in Comment 
a. of the said Restatement, page 403. It is submitted, further 
that the parties supplemented the law by their contract, in that 
they assigned the risk of such a mistake to Gregory, by 
implication. (See Exhibit 2-P, "Exhibit A11 of that agreement, 
paragraphs A and D.) 
Therefore, it must be concluded that the factual 
elements of the standards argued by Defendants have not been 
satisfied, Further, neither the authorities nor the cases argued 
by Gregory in Appellant7s Brief support the proposition that a 
mutual mistake was made in this case which would entitle Gregory 
to relief of rescission. 
Each of the cases on rescission is distinguishable on 
its facts from the case at bar. In most cases cited by Gregory, 
the parties were demonstrated to not have a meeting of the minds 
as to the transaction into which they proposed to enter. For 
example, two cases involving subdivisions were cited. (Eiland v. 
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Powell 65 S.E. 2d 737 (West Virginia 1951) and Chesapeake Homes, 
Inc. v. McGrath 240 A.2d 245 (Maryland 1968)). In each case, a 
seller on behalf of a commercial subdivider misrepresented the 
boundary of a particular lot. The parties did not document the 
representation in writing. There was no evidence that the 
subdivider attempted to divide the property as represented. 
Rather, the subdivider intended to sell a lot according to a 
platted subdivision, while the buyer desired to purchase that 
which had been orally represented. The contracts were rescinded 
for a failure of the parties to reach a meeting of the minds. In 
the case at bar, as has been established in this Brief, the 
evidence showed that the parties both thought that the legal 
description described the boundary which they discussed, and 
intended that that be the boundary which was described. As 
indicated by the authorities cited in Grahns' second argument, 
this is the key difference between the remedy of reformation and 
the remedy of rescission where a mutual mistake has been made. 
Gregory, in Appellant's Brief, quotes the court in 
Metzler v. Bolen, 137 F. Supp. 457 (North Dakota 1956) out of 
context. The whole point, in context, is helpful: 
To justify reformation on the ground of 
mistake, the mistake must have been made in 
the drawing of the instrument and not in the 
making of the contract which it evidences. A 
mistake as to the existing situation which 
leads either one or both of the parties to 
enter into a contract which they would not 
have entered into had they been apprised of 
the actual facts, will not justify 
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reformation. It is not what the parties would 
have intended if they had known better, but 
what they did intend at the time, informed as 
they were. 
Metzler v. Bolen, Ibid, page 461. The court ruled in that case 
that there is no mistake in the language of the contract. 
The mutual mistake between Grahns and Gregory was in 
their assumption that the instrument of conveyance, the deed, 
contained a legal description which fulfilled their expectation 
as to the land it described. Defendants' argument in Point I: a) 
fails to establish facts to demonstrate that any other mistake 
was mutually made; and b) fails to cite legal authority which 
supports the proposition, under the factual circumstances. 
IV. 
DEFENDANT TRUSTS DO NOT ESTABLISH THAT MUTUAL MISTAKE 
IS A DEFENSE TO REFORMATION OF THE CONTRACT 
(In opposition to Point II, Appellant's Brief) 
In their argument in Point II of Appellant's Brief, 
defendant Trusts fail to establish their point, either by logic 
or evidence. No attempt will be made to re-argue the principles 
concerning mutual mistake and reformation, dealt with previously 
in this Brief. The cases which Gregory cites do not countervail 
against the arguments of the Grahns. 
In fact, Defendant Trusts misstate the holding in the 
Vermont case which they cite, Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 
(1987). They recite that the Vermont court refused reformation. 
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Instead, the court remands the case to the Trial Court to hear 
additional evidence and to determine whether the parties can be 
given the bargain which they made, which was established to the 
satisfaction of the court. If it can, the court ruled, "* * * 
then the deed may be reformed to allow Bourne her thirty-acre 
reservation." Bourne, Ibid, at 363. 
V. 
CONTRACT PROVISIONS ARE NOT MERGED INTO A MISTAKEN DEED 
(In opposition to Point IV, Appellant's Brief.) 
In Point IV of Appellant's Brief, it is argued that, 
despite the mistake in the legal description in the deed from 
Gregory to Grahns, Grahns cannot seek reformation because of the 
general principle that the provisions of the contract are merged 
into the deed. 
It is elementary that the principle advanced by Gregory 
is incorrect. If it were correct, no case for reformation of a 
deed would exist. In Neeley v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979, at 981 
(Utah 1979), the court acknowledged this basic principle as 
follows: 
Nevertheless, when a deed executes a contract 
of sale of land, all provisions of the prior 
contract are usually merged into the deed; and 
when a party denies merger due to mistake, he 
has the burden to show mistake by clear and 
convincing evidence. (Emphasis deleted) 
It is to be noted that, in the context of this 
argument, Gregory contends that the Trial Court "* * * made a 
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finding of fact that Gregory intended to convey 1.11 acres which 
was exactly what they did." (Appellant's Brief, page 42.) 
Gregory does not cite this Court to the record. The Trial Court 
did not enter a finding of fact as stated. Instead, the court 
found that Gregory and the Grahns "accepted11, passively, the 
description statement as to the amount of land contained in 
Parcel 1. There is no finding that that acceptance was 
important to the parties. It was used by the court to establish 
equitable compensation for Gregory. 
Finally, it is noted that the case cited by Defendant 
Trusts as support for their proposition Delbrusky v. Isbell, 740 
P. 2d 1325 (Utah 1987), is not a case involving a mutual mistake 
of fact. 
VI. 
IN CONSTRUING BOUNDARIES STATED IN DEEDS, 
THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IS THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATION 
(In opposition to Point V, Appellant's Brief.) 
In Appellant's Brief, Point V, Gregory attempts to 
argue that the metes and bounds description prevails despite 
references to the intentions of the parties that the south and 
east side of the Private Drive serve as a boundary. Defendant 
Trusts attempt, thereby, to avoid the effects of equity. 
Their brief cites Neeley, supra. In that case, an 
action to quiet title to certain real property, two purchasers of 
adjoining parcels of land litigated over that which they received 
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fails, the court will employ a rule of construction which favors 
the grantee. See Russel v. Geyser-Marion Goldmining Company, 42 3 
P.2d 487 (Utah 1967). 
It is respectfully submitted that the legal 
descriptions and the other evidence before the Court demonstrate 
together a sufficiently clear expression of the intent of the 
parties to wit: that the driveway was intended to be part of 
Parcel 1. 
VII. 
BRADSHAWS DO NOT ASK FOR REVERSAL OF THE ORDER TO RESCIND 
THEIR CONTRACT WITH GREGORY FOR THE PURCHASE OF PARCEL 2, 
AND, THEREFORE, HAVE NO PROPERTY INTEREST AND 
NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR RELIEF ON APPEAL. 
The Bradshaws, in their Brief, do not appeal the 
decision of the Trial Court to rescind the agreement between 
Bradshaws and Gregory for the purchase of Parcel 2. (See 
Judgment and Order dated December 23, 1988, Record, page 543, et 
seq.; page 3, paragraph 3.) 
Nonetheless, Bradshaws submit a Brief on Appeal to 
essentially join with Gregory in his appeal from the judgment of 
reformation. They also seek reversal of the judgment of the 
Trial Court that their claims against plaintiffs be dismissed for 
no cause of action. (Judgment and Order, Record, page 543; 
paragraph 4 on page 3. See also Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in support thereof. Record, page 530.) 
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Refractories allegedly agreed to provide their insulated 
aggregate for the construction of Bradshaws7 house if, in return, 
Bradshaws would allow them to use it as a model. Without the 
land upon which to build, any alleged contract could not be 
performed. Due to the rescission of their contract to purchase 
Parcel 2, Bradshaws had no property and hence had no way to 
perform any contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories. Likewise, 
in regard to the argument concerning "wrongful injunction", since 
rescission was granted by the Trial Court, the Trial Court's 
injunction was clearly proper to prohibit Bradshaws from building 
on ground which they did not own. 
The appeal of Bradshaws, therefore, is without a 
foundation, and should be dismissed based upon that reason. 
It is respectfully submitted that Bradshaws cannot now 
argue that they implied or meant to seek reversal of the judgment 
of the Trial Court to rescind the purchase of that property. 
Bradshaws have cast their lot. The Plaintiffs brought, in this 
matter, a Motion to Dismiss the appeal of Bradshaws consistent 
with their good faith tactical decision to avoid opening an issue 
in regard to rescission which might then be dealt with by 
Bradshaws in their Reply Brief. At the point in time that the 
Motion to Dismiss was filed, Plaintiffs' whole Respondent's 
Brief, up to the point of this argument, had been researched, 
analyzed, planned and written. Responsive arguments to the 
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Gregory would be free to enforce their 
agreement for sale of Parcel 2 without 
mistaken assumptions. 
And, on page 6 thereof, Bradshaws continued: 
The Bradshaws and Gregory have never had 
a dispute. * * * Gregory has never voided the 
contract with Bradshaws. * * * 
The Trial Court did, however. 
Since Bradshaws have no property interest in Parcel 2, 
the issues of whether they were bona fide purchasers, whe~ther the 
injunction was wrongful, or whether their contract with Rocky 
Mountain Refractories was valid, are no longer relevant. 
Bradshaws have no standing to seek the relief identified in their 
appeal, even if, for the sake of argument, they are right. 
VIII. 
BRADSHAWS WERE NOT BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
In the case of Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P. 2d 1271 
(Utah, 1984), at 1273, the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that 
»* * * the right of reformation of a deed can be cut off by 
purchase of the property by a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the mistake.11 Bradshaws claim that they were 
bona fide purchasers. They clearly were not. 
A bona fide purchaser would have to take the deed 
without notice of the mistake, as indicated in the Hottinger 
decision. The facts adduced at trial were that Bradshaws were 
well aware of the facts relating to the mistake at the time they 
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Bradshaws attempt to argue that they purchased the 
property before they discovered the mistake. They claim the 
purchase was made when they signed their earnest money agreement. 
The case which they cite would appear to resolve their confusion. 
In Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), at page 
805, it is acknowledged that "[a]n earnest money agreement is a 
legally binding executory contract for the sale of real 
property." (Emphasis added, Citations omitted) The closing, in 
this case on November 20, 1986, was the time that the purchase 
was completed. Prior to that closing, Bradshaws could: clearly 
have avoided, without any repercussions to them, performance 
under their earnest money agreement. 
The Trial Court's decision that Bradshaws were not bona 
fide purchasers is clearly supported by the evidence. The 
findings and judgment cannot be upset unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates them. See Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra. 
IX. 
BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAVE AN ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT 
WITH ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRACTORIES 
Bradshaws claim, in their Brief, that they had entered 
into an enforceable agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories, 
and were deprived of the benefits of that agreement, and 
therefore damaged. However, the evidence before the Trial Court 
was clearly to the contrary, and supported the judgment by the 
Trial Court. That judgment should not now be questioned, unless 
it can be demonstrated that the evidence preponderates against 
it. Del Porto v. Nicolo, supra. 
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which had been submitted to it, granted on December 19, 1986, a 
preliminary injunction essentially restraining Bradshaw from 
breaking ground to construct a home on Parcel 2, and/or the 
Private Drive, pending resolution of the dispute between the 
parties. It was, in fact, Bradshaws' threat which made necessary 
the commencement of this action, rather than an attempt to 
resolve the dispute by negotiations. It is submitted that his 
adamant position in that regard has kept the Grahns and~ Gregory 
from finding a solution and avoiding significant legal expense. 
The order of the Trial Court is found in the Record at 
page 87. 
The motion and supporting affidavit begin at page 20 of 
the Record. Bradshaw makes no argument in his Brief to support 
his supposition that this Court might find the injunction to have 
been wrongful. 
It has been exhaustively demonstrated in this Brief 
that the evidence supported the decision of the Trial Court at 
trial. That decision logically followed the injunction which was 
granted. The evidence in the stipulation, upon which the 
injunction was granted, was significantly more favorable to 
Bradshaw, than the facts adduced at trial. (See Addendum I, 
Facts.) As has been pointed out above, the Trial Court rescinded 
the agreement whereby Bradshaw would have purchased Parcel 2. 
Bradshaw has not appealed that decision, and cannot now complain. 
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No evidence was adduced before the Trial Court to 
indicate that Grahns and Gregorys either negotiated or agreed to 
an amount of land to be contained in Parcel 1. In fact, to the 
contrary, the evidence was that the parties did not concern 
themselves in relation to that agreement with the amount of land 
in Parcel 1, but instead to the physical boundaries thereof, as 
represented. (See Statement o,f Fact, 5.d.) The key, unbiased 
testimony in that regard was that of the real estate agent for 
Defendant Trusts, Noel Taylor. He was told by his principals 
that he could sell the property as a whole, or in one of two 
parcels, which were identified for him by their physical 
boundaries, especially focusing upon the staked boundary along 
the south and east side of the Private Drive. (Transcript: pages 
8, 27, 28, 33 and 34.) He testified, in response to a question 
concerning any discussions which he may have had regarding 
specific acreage of either parcel by implying the negative and by 
focusing upon the Grahns, concern that they purchase the Private 
Drive. (Transcript: pages 7 and 8.) In fact, Mr. Taylor 
testified that it was he who arrived at the recitation of the 
size of 1.1 acres, by simple subtraction. (Pages 35 and 36 of 
the transcript.) He made no reference to any concern of either 
of the parties in regard to that description of acreage. 
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The evidence adduced at trial also indicated that the 
deduced acreage, for Parcel 1, was incorrect. Mr. McNeil 
testified that the amount of land contained in the mistaken legal 
description was 1.19 acres. (Transcript: page 460, line 8.) 
There was no evidence before the Trial Court that the 
quantification of land was actively made a part of the deal or 
"accepted" by the parties. The best the Trial Court could do 
based upon the evidence was to draw a conclusion from assumptions 
which were not testified to. Apparently, a person in the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's office created a legal description by 
deduction, using the legal description for Parcel 2 which had 
been drawn by Mr. McNeil. (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, page 343, 
lines 8-13.) Since that legal description also contained the 
deduction that 1.11 acres must exist (1.67 acres minus .56 
acres) , the Trial Court may have assumed that there was an 
implication that the parties accepted it. That implication, if 
reasoned by the Trial Court, was weakened by the fact that the 
recitation of the size of the property was not used in the deed 
between the parties at closing. (Transcript: Mr. Gregory, pages 
352-353.) There was no testimony that its absence concerned any 
of the parties. 
The evidence was strong at trial that the physical 
boundaries of Parcel 1 were important to Grahns and Gregory. Mr. 
McNeil had been instructed in regard to the boundary between the 
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properties; representations had been made concerning the 
boundaries between the properties; and the agreement was drawn to 
refer to that boundary. (Statements of Fact 1, 4 and 5.) 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the 
preponderance of the evidence indicated that the price which the 
Grahns agreed to pay to Gregory was for a certain piece of land, 
and had no regard to its quantified size. Judgment was granted 
to reform the deed to properly describe the land which the 
parties agreed to buy and sell. The land was always the same 
size, and was familiar to both Grahns and the Gregorys. The 
quantity, in terms of acreage, contained therein was not 
important to them. It is respectfully submitted that this Court 
should make its own evaluation of that evidence, and that this 
Court will find that the evidence preponderates against the 
finding by the Trial Court. The error in the judgment should be 
corrected, and the reformation adjusted so that it does not 
include an award of compensatory damages to Defendant Trusts. 
II 
GRAHNS ARE ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The Trial Court did not award attorneys' fees, but did 
award costs to the Plaintiffs against all of the Defendants, 
except McNeil. (Judgment and Order, Record, page 543, et seq. , 
page 3, paragraph 7, thereof.) Grahns appeal from that order, 
and submit that the Trial Court should have ordered Defendant 
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Gregory to reimburse them for their attorneys7 fees incurred at 
trial, and further for those fees incurred on appeal, due to the 
breach of the contract. 
The Earnest Money Sales Agreement between Grahns and 
Gregory (Exhibit 2-P), on page 3 of Exhibit A thereof, made 
provision for an option to purchase the lot which became known at 
trial as Parcel 2. Seller granted the option to Grahns in 
paragraph D of that Exhibit. In relevant part, the contractual 
language provided: 
* * * Should Buyer fail to exercise Buyers7 
option under this provision, then Seller shall 
have the right to sell the property within 
ninety (90) days of the date of the expiration 
of Sellers7 said option on terms and 
conditions no more favorable than those 
originally offered under this paragraph to 
Buyer. Should the offer be amended making the 
terms more favorable, or should the said offer 
fail and a new offer be received, then the 
said amendment or offer shall be, once again, 
subject to the terms of this provision. The 
terms of this provision shall survive the 
closing of the purchase of the property which 
is the subject of the main Agreement. 
(Emphasis added) 
A copy of the Agreement is attached to this Brief in the 
Addendum. 
In paragraph N of the form agreement utilized by the 
parties, it was also agreed: 
* * * Both parties agree that, should either 
party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorneys7 fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
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terminating this agreement, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by applicable 
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
suit or otherwise. 
The uncontroverted evidence before the Trial Court was 
that the Grahns were not granted an opportunity to take advantage 
of the amended terms of the agreement between Bradshaws and 
Gregory in regard to the purchase of Parcel 2. (See Statement of 
Facts, 11.a. through d. , and citations to the transcript set 
forth therein.) 
In particular, Bradshaws did not close their purchase 
within the two-week period which was called for under the Earnest 
Money Agreement which was offered to the Grahns. It was this 
provision which prevented the Grahns from accepting their option. 
(Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 67-68.) Instead, Bradshaws closed 
approximately eighty days later. 
Further, Bradshaws and Gregorys discovered new facts in 
regard to the property description, dealt with in detail 
hereinabove. Grahns were not informed, but were misled by 
Gregory, in bad faith. (Transcript: Mrs. Grahn, pages 70-72.) 
That discovery led to the amended agreement that the Bradshaw 
purchase would be voided if the property (including land 
belonging to Grahns) could not be delivered. These events led in 
turn to the commencement of this lawsuit. Grahns submit that 
this agreement (Exhibit 13-P) also constituted a significant 
amendment to the agreement to purchase. It clearly "made the 
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terms more favorable11. From the viewpoint of the Grahns, it is 
most significant that they could have learned of the mistake by 
simply hearing about the changes relating to the proposed 
purchase, and could have benefitted greatly from a new option. 
Grahns could further have purchased Parcel 2 knowing that they 
would protect their interest in the Private Drive no matter how 
the problem concerning the legal description might have 
ultimately been worked out. 
It is submitted, further, that by the failure to again 
offer the option to the Grahns after October 11, 1986, Gregory 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
which he owed to Grahns under the terms of that option. In fact, 
the bad faith shown by Gregory, when given a direct opportunity 
to advise the Grahns, makes this point undeniable. See Weber 
Meadow-View Corp. v. Wilds, 575 P.2d 1053, at 1055, (Utah 1978), 
a case concerning an option to purchase real estate, wherein it 
is stated: 
There is no doubt about the correctness of 
[the] contention that one who enters into a 
contract must cooperate in good faith to carry 
out the intention the parties had in mind when 
it was made; and that he should not be 
permitted to engage in any subterfuge or 
devious means to prevent the other party from 
performing, and then use it as an excuse for 
failing to keep his own commitment. 
See also Nielson v. Droubav, 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982), at 1297, 
where the Court held that the parties to an option agreement owe 
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each other a duty to act fairly and in good faith to fulfill 
their obligations to each other. In good faith, Gregory should 
have disclosed what he knew, at the very least, and also should 
have advised Grahns of the new more favorable terms. Grahns 
could then have sought to protect their rights under the option 
before the sale to Bradshaw was closed. The legal issues would 
have been much simpler. 
The evidence clearly supported the Complaint o-f Grahns 
that the option had been breached. There was no evidence to the 
contrary. The Trial Court, simply, failed to rule on that cause 
of action. It did, nonetheless, rescind the transaction between 
Gregory and Bradshaws, as prayed by Plaintiffs, and placed the 
parties in the same position as before the Bradshaw transaction 
(except for the reformation). The option of Plaintiffs was 
thereby reinstated. 
Plaintiffs submit that the Trial Court could not have 
so concluded without also concluding that the option agreement 
was breached by Gregory. The breach of that option agreement so 
influenced the course of events that this entire lawsuit, and 
appeal, resulted. The contractual provision for attorneys7 fees 
provides that the prevailing party should recover reasonable 
attorneys' fees which may accrue from enforcing the agreement or 
in pursuing any remedy provided by applicable law. 
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Under the express terms of the contract, Grahns are 
entitled to costs (which they were awarded below), as well as a 
reasonable attorneys7 fee. See Estate of Schmidt v. Downs, 775 
P.2d 427 (Utah App. 1989), page 431, and Nielson v. Droubav, 
supra, at 1297. This Court of Appeals, through Judge Bench, has 
recently also stated: 
We begin our analysis with the premise 
that "[p]rovisions in written contracts 
providing for payment of attorneys7 -fees 
should ordinarily be honored by the courts.11 
(Citations omitted) "Furthermore, contrary to 
[the] contention that attorneys7 fees should 
be determined on the basis of an equitable 
standard, attorneys7 fees, when awarded as 
allowed by law, are awarded as a matter of 
legal right." (Citation omitted) "Since the 
right is contractual, the court does not 
possess the same equitable discretion to deny 
attorneys7 fees that it has when fashioning 
equitable remedies, or applying a statute 
which allows the discretionary award of such 
fees." (Citation omitted) 
Cobabe v. Crawford, 117 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, at 27, Case 
#8880567-CA, September 20, 1989. 
The Plaintiffs found it necessary to enforce their 
legal rights as they were agreed to by contract. This entire 
action is consistent with and part of their pursuit of their 
legal remedies in relation to that agreement. Evidence of the 
fees and the issue were submitted to and accepted by the Trial 
Court in connection with Plaintiffs7 case, by proffer. 
(Transcript: page 272, lines 3-24.) Based upon the evidence, the 
Trial Court erred in its failure to rule that the contract was 
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breached, and therefore that attorneys' fees should have been 
awarded to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are now entitled to that 
award. 
CONCLUSION 
The unique property at Brookburn is a beautiful estate, 
abundant with trees, foliage and vegetation, with a lovely old 
home nestled next to a stream. The home has historically been 
served by a 500 foot long private drive which winds down the hill 
under a canopy of trees. 
When they entered the picture, Dr. and Mrs. Grahn were 
informed about the history of the property and were told that 
there were two parcels which made up the main parcel, one or both 
of which could be purchased. The parcels had been separated by 
Gregory, the trustee of the trusts which owned the property. The 
separation had been made along the south and east side of the 
Private Drive. Gregory had directed and intended for it to be 
that way, and would not have done it any other way. The surveyor 
intended for it to be that way. Survey stakes still marked the 
surveyor's work. 
The Grahns diligently confirmed the boundaries of the 
larger parcel with the home on it with those who spoke on behalf 
of the Defendant Trusts. Those people, Noel Taylor, Mrs. Gregory 
and Mr. Gregory, all made especially clear that boundary between 
the parcels. It was even specifically identified in the Earnest 
82 
Money Sales Agreement which was eventually entered into. The 
buyers and the seller had a meeting of minds when their sale was 
closed on August 1, 1986, 
The description in the deed given to Grahns mistakenly 
failed to describe that border line between the parcels. When 
discovered by the Grahns, they promptly brought suit to (among 
other things) reform the description to match the agreement 
between the parties which had been formed and had existed at the 
time of closing. The Trial Court ordered that reformation. That 
order should be affirmed, except to withdraw the compensatory 
damages which the Trial Court also ordered be given to Gregory. 
There was no extra land given to the Grahns. Through the 
reformation, they received exactly that which had been bargained 
for. The price need not be reformed. 
The Defendant Trusts attempt to persuade this Court on 
appeal that the Trial Court's decision should be reversed and 
that the purchase by the Grahns should be rescinded. However, 
they are unable to demonstrate that the elements of rescission, 
as to either theory which they propound before this Court, are 
satisfied, even by arguing facts which are not supported by 
evidence which was adduced at trial. Further, they failed to act 
promptly and unequivocally in regard to that intent to rescind, 
or to even announce that intention to rescind. The arguments of 
Defendant Trusts that the description came before, and/or 
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prevails over the intent of the parties are not persuasive. In 
fact, those arguments demonstrate the reason that equitable 
remedies continue to be an important part of modern law. 
The Defendants Bradshaw, after many visits to the 
property and long contemplation, offered to purchase Parcel 2 one 
month after the Grahns bought Parcel 1. Well before their 
closing, Bradshaws and Gregorys discovered the surveyor's 
mistake, and in fact entered into a special agreement which would 
allow the purchase by Bradshaws to be voided if Bradshaws could 
not have the property which crossed the Private Drive. Bradshaws 
were not bona fide purchasers, and could not block the 
reformation of the deed to Parcel 1. They did not suffer damages 
in this case. They had no agreement with Rocky Mountain 
Refractories, and could not have performed anyway. The Trial 
Court did not wrongfully issue an injunction, but, in fact, 
properly ordered that the purchase of Parcel 2 by Bradshaws be 
rescinded. 
Dutiful, good faith conformance with the agreement 
between Dr. and Mrs. Grahn and Mr. Gregory, as trustee, would 
have simplified and resolved (or at least set the stage for 
resolution of) this dispute. Gregory owed the Grahns a duty to 
advise them of: 
a. The extension of time for closing on the 
purchase of Parcel 2; 
b. The discovery of the surveyor's mistake and 
the resulting problems; and 
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c. The amendment of the terms of purchase to 
include an agreement that the purchase of Parcel 2 
would be void if Gregory could not deliver part of 
the land which Grahns and Gregory had agreed would 
be within the boundaries of Parcel 1. 
Gregory thus breached that agreement. Worse, Gregory even lied 
to the Grahns to prevent further inquiry by them before he was 
able to sell to the Bradshaws, and thus significantly complicate 
the situation. The situation, as it developed, led to this 
litigation. Significant attorneys' fees have been incurred, 
which should not have been necessary. Due to the breach of the 
contract, Grahns are entitled to recover their•attorneys' fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of November, 
1989. 
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This Addendum is presented to identify and cross 
reference to the correct factual evidence the misstated, 
incomplete, inaccurate or disproved "facts" which were alleged by 
Defendants in their brief on appeal. As indicated in the 
Plaintiffs' Brief, most of the facts alleged by Defendants were 
supported only by citations to an early Stipulation which was 
submitted to the trial court, prior to discovery or factual 
analysis, solely for the purposes of a hearing on a preliminary 
injunction. It was not used at trial. Most of the factual 
information described below was unknown to Plaintiffs at the time 
the stipulating was submitted, and was learned in discovery. 
If the Justices of this court were to rely on that 
Statement of Facts, they would consider a case much different 
than that considered by the trial court. 
By reference to the paragraphs numbered corresponding 
to those in the Statement of Facts submitted by 
Defendants/Appellants, Plaintiffs will briefly address those 
misstatements, inaccuracies or disproven "facts" which were 
alleged in the Appellants' Briefs, 
Para. 1, page 5. Subject: Size of the property when 
first acquired. 
Although immaterial, no evidence was submitted to the 
trial court in this regard. 
Para. 2, page 5. Subject: Division of the property in 
1961 without subdivision approval; sale of some of the property; 
retention of approximately 1.67 acres. 
Though also immaterial, these allegations were not 
supported by evidence. Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of 
Defendant Trusts, testified to divisive conveyances in 1960 and 
1964. (Transcript, page 417-418) There was no testimony in 
regard to a sale of the land, nor the size of the land retained. 
Concerning the subdivision process, some conflicting testimony 
was given by Warren Reynolds, Senior Planner for Salt Lake County 
Planning & Zoning. (See Transcript, pages 250-251) 
Para 3, page 5-6. Subject: Conveyance to Trustee, in 
trust, in 1978. 
No evidence was submitted to support this allegation 
during trial. Evidence to the contrary of this statement was 
introduced. Noel Taylor, the broker who listed the property 
(Transcript, page 4, line 9) testified that his first listing of 
the property was entered into with Carolyn Eccles (and, 
therefore, not the Defendant Trusts). (Transcript, page 19, line 
7, et seq.) 
Para 5, page 6. Subject: Construction of the Private 
Drive. 
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Gregory claims that Eccles constructed the Private 
Drive to the estate home. This statement was disproved at trial. 
Barbara Danielson testified that the Private Drive was an old 
wagon trail, which had existed for approximately 100 years on the 
property. (Transcript, page 423, lines 4-9). No other evidence 
was entered in this regard. 
Paras 6, 7 & 8, pages 6 & 7. Subject: The division of 
the property which is the subject of the action into two parcels, 
and the instructions to engineer Scott McNeil. 
The statements are subtly, but significantly misstated 
and inaccurate. It became clear at trial that the property was 
divided by the Defendant Trusts in 1984 in order to deed, to 
Barbara Danielson, a parcel which was intended by them to be 
approximately one-half acre in size; and which was to be located 
on the south and east side of the private drive, leaving that 
private drive to serve the main parcel, upon which the home was 
situated. (Transcript: testimony of Mrs. Gregory, page 156, 
lines 4-13; testimony of Barbara Danielson, page 419, lines 
11-25; testimony of Mr. McNeil, page 222, lines 7-21; page 228, 
lines 14-17; page 229, lines 19-20; page 235, lines 16-22; page 
246, lines 8-18; page 475, lines 20-24; page 475, lines 11-18.) 
Further, the evidence was that Mr. McNeil wrote a description 
only for the parcel to be separated (see above). Please see 
parts 1 and 2 of plaintiffs Statement of Facts. 
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Para 12, page 8. Subject: Remaining parcel contained 
1.11 acres, according to survey. 
There was no evidence of an intent on the part of Mr. 
McNeil or Gregory to create a parcel of a particular size, 1.11 
acres, or otherwise, on the main parcel, on which the private 
drive and the home were situated. No survey was done of the 
whole property, as later became apparent. (See above) It also 
became clear that the l.ll acre amount was obtained by 
subtracting the .56 acre amount from the presumed total of 1.67 
acres (the quantity of land which defendant Trusts believed was 
in the total parcel prior to division). (Transcript, testimony 
of Noel Taylor, pages 35 to 36.) Even these quantities, it 
turned out, were mistaken — the mistaken descriptions contained 
1.19 acres and .57 acres, for a total of 1.76 acres. 
(Transcript, testomony of McNeil, page 4 60, lines 5-9.) 
Para 14, page 8. Subject: That Gregory listed parcel 1 
and parcel 2 for sale in 1984. 
Although a minor point, this was disproven. It was 
shown at trial that the property was first listed by Carolyn 
Eccles in March, 1984. (Transcript, testimony of Noel Taylor, 
page 19, line 7, et seq.) Further, the property was not listed 
in parcels, but was listed as one parcel. (Transcript, testimony 
of Noel Taylor, page 26, lines 9-10 and 21-25.) 
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Para 15, page 8-9. Subject: Grahn inquiries regarding 
boundaries and representations regarding "approximate" dividing 
line. 
Evidence at trial clearly indicated that Grahns heard 
and relied upon representations that the Private Drive was part 
of Parcel 1, and that the south and east side of that drive was 
the dividing line between Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. They were 
advised that Mr. McNeil had been directed, specifically in that 
regard, and that he had placed certain stakes, which were shown 
to the Grahns, to indicate the property line. (See citations to 
the transcript, above, in section 4 of plaintiffs Statement of 
Facts set forth in the Brief, and, especially, the testimony of 
Noel Taylor, transcript, page 34; Mrs. Grahn, pages 56 & 57; and 
Mrs. Gregory, page 161-162.) 
Para 16, page 9. Subject: Gregory representation to 
Grahns regarding boundary line. 
Here, defendants allege that Gregory represented that 
they had asked McNeil to create a legal description for parcel 2, 
and that he had done so designating the boundary as approximately 
the southeast edge of the private drive. Evidence at trial 
indicated that specific directions were given to Mr. McNeil in 
regard to where the boundary would be, with no suggestion as to 
"approximation11. (See remarks in regard to paragraphs 6, 7 and 
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8, above.) Mr. McNeil created a legal description for Parcel 2 
after creating Parcel 2 from the directions which were given to 
him. Parcel 2 did not exist prior to that creation. 
Para 17, page 9. Subject: Grahns relied on "those 
representations". 
There was no evidence adduced at the court regarding 
"those" representations, or any such reliance. The Grahns did 
rely on the representations actually made and adduced into 
evidence. See above and statement of Facts of plaintiffs. See 
also, especially, testimony of Noel Taylor (transcript, pages 
7-8) . 
Para 18, page 9. Subject: Grahn and Gregory Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement. 
The best evidence of this agreement is the agreement, 
itself. It is important to note that, in that Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement, the parties referred to the boundary between 
Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 as being the existing Private Drive. (See 
the Agreement, itself, Exhibit 2-P, and testimony of Josephine 
Grahn, page 62.) 
Para 2 0, pages 9 & 10. Subject: Description of 
negotiations. 
Gregory alleges as fact that Gregory rejected a request 
for a covenant that the property "had been divided in compliance 
with law". This statement was disproved and is therefore 
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misleading. It was established that Gregory agreed to a 
contractual covenant concerning the lawful division of the 
parcels (transcript, testimony of Noel Taylor, page 39, lines 
3-7, and subsequent related testimony). Gregory also alleges 
that it had been explained to Grahns that the property seemed to 
already be divided according to the legal descriptions of the two 
parcels. Regarding the tax notices, defendant Trusts represented 
to Grahns that the parcels had been officially separated, and 
Mrs. Gregory advised Mrs. Grahn that the tax notice had the legal 
description. (Transcript: testimony of Josephine Grahn, page 83, 
line 9, et seq. . page 84, lines 3-25; testimony of Harold 
Gregory, page 304, lines 2-6.) There was no evidence that the 
legal descriptions had more importance than the representations, 
but instead, it was evident Grahns and Gregory believed that the 
legal descriptions described that which had been represented. 
Para 22, page 10. Subject: Closing, source of legal 
description. 
This paragraph inaccurately and misleadingly describes 
the facts. As indicated in connection with the next preceding 
paragraph, Josephine Grahn went to the Salt Lake County Recorder 
to obtain a copy of a legal description, which Mrs. Gregory 
represented she would find. It was simply more convenient to go 
there than to the Gregory's house. (Transcript, pages 83-84.) 
There was no evidence that Mrs. Gregory would have produced a 
7 
different description. The County's legal description was 
apparently produced by deductive work, including the size 
estimate. The Grahns did not know the source of that legal 
description, at that time, but in fact believed, based upon the 
representation of Gregory, that the survey had produced legal 
descriptions of both Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. (Transcript, page 
82.) The legal description used in the Warranty Deed was 
similar, but not exactly the same. Its source was unknown. It 
did not state or refer to the quantity of land in the parcel. 
(Transcript, testimony of HaroLd Gregory, pages 352-353.) 
Para 23, page 10. Subject: Grahns and Gregory "under 
impression" that the Private Drive was in parcel 1. 
It was established by evidence at trial, that Grahns 
and Gregory were far more than under an impression in regard to 
the location of the Private Drive, in fact, it was represented 
and agreed that the Private Drive was part of Parcel 1. (See 
preceding references to the transcript.) 
Para 24, pages 10 & 11. Subject: Parcel 1 contains 
1.11 acre, although it does not contain the private drive. 
This allegation was not established by the evidence, 
and is argumentative. It was unclear in the evidence as to 
whether the legal description of Parcel 1 could be read to 
contain the Private Drive, and also as to the amount of land 
contained therein. (See preceding references to the transcript.) 
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Whether the private drive was part of Parcel 1 was the subject of 
the lawsuit. The trial court found that it was intended, 
represented and agreed that it would be. 
Para 25, page 11. Subject: No overlap in descriptions 
of the Deeds for Parcels 1 and 2. ' 
This statement of fact is misleading in its failure to 
acknowledge that the testimony also indicated that there may be 
land which is not described by either of the deeds, and would 
therefore be a "no man's land11, thus further indicating that a 
mistake was made in the drafting of the description. 
(Transcript, testimony of McNeil, page 465.) Mr. McNeil also 
testified as to the numerous discrepancies, or mistakes set forth 
in the legal description which was used in the sale between 
Grahns and Gregory. (Transcript pages 4 67-474.) He concluded 
that it was clear, to him, that the legal description was 
mistaken in what it conveyed. (Transcript, page 478.) 
Para 31, page 12. Subject: Bradshaw reliance upon 
survey. 
The evidence in regard to Bradshaws' claimed reliance 
upon the survey, although unimportant to the issues, is not clear 
from the evidence. (See transcript: testimony of Noel Taylor, 
page 13 & 14, especially lines 6-9 on 14.) 
Para 32, pages 12 & 13. Subject: Telephone conference 
between Mrs. Bradshaw and Mrs. Grahn. 
9 
The statement concerns events leading up to the 
application for official subdivision by the County of Parcel 2. 
It is incomplete, and misleading in regard to its description of 
the conversation. (See the testimony concerning the telephone 
call between Mrs. Grahn and Mrs. Bradshaw: transcript, Mrs. 
Grahn, page 69, lines 3-17 and pages 109-110; Mrs. Bradshaw, page 
375, lines 1-9.) 
Para 36, page 14. Subject: The surveyor's mistake. 
This statement concerning the surveyor's mistake is 
incomplete and inaccurate. Mr. Mc!!eil testified that he had made 
a mistake in the description, not put the road in the wrong 
place. (See foregoing citations to the transcript; see also 
transcript, pages 443-446, page 224, lines 20-21, page 228, lines 
14-17.) Defendants' allegation also states that the Private 
Drive is actually within the description of Parcel 2. However, 
the only expert evidence indicated that a correct reading of the 
legal description concerning Parcel 2 would place the boundary on 
the southeasterly side of the Private Drive. (Transcript, pages 
464-465.) 
Para 39, page 15. Subject: Revised drctwing, showing 
what McNeil "*** believed to be the relationship of the Private 
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2.!f 
Significant information is missing, and the statement 
is therefore misleading. As demonstrated in plaintiff's 
10 
Statement of Facts, after discovery of the mistakes in his 
survey, McNeil first drew a survey reforming the boundaries 
consistent with the directions which he had originally been 
given. (Transcript, page 229, lines 19-21; Exhibit 12-P.) Mr. 
McNeil also indicated that there is a one-half acre parcel on the 
east side of that Private Drive. (Transcript, page 475, lines 
20-25.) Further, after presenting his proposal to Gregory and 
Bradshaws, he was directed by the defendants to draw the drawing 
(not a survey) which became Exhibit 9-P at trial, to attempt to 
make actual use of the Deed description and thereby illustrate 
«*** the survey description and its relationship to the road." 
(Transcript, pages 230-232 quoting, 232, lines 7 & 8.) 
Para 41, page 15. Subject: Gregory failure to inform 
Grahns. Also County postponement of decision. 
This statement significantly fails to point out that 
the Grahns were, in fact, affirmatively misled in regard to the 
existence of the problem. (Transcript, testimony of Mrs. Grahn, 
pages 71-72.) Also, it should be noted that there is no evidence 
in the trial transcript that the County postponed its decision in 
regard to subdivision. Further, it should be noted that the 
grant of the subdivision request was based upon mistaken 
information, due to the fact that the County was not informed of 
the mistaken survey. (Transcript, testimony of Warren Reynolds, 
page 249, lines 20-22; pages 260-261, and pages 268-269.) 
11 
Para 42, page 15. Subject: Bradshaws closed according 
to September 1, 1986 Earnest Money Sale Agreement. 
The evidence was clearly to the contrary of this 
allegation. The closing between Bradshaws and Gregory was 
significantly later than that called for in the Earnest Money 
Agreement; there was no contingency in the Earnest Money 
Agreement for zoning; and no term vas set forth in that agreement 
to call for a side agreement to allow the parties to void their 
sale if certain property could not be conveyed. See the 
Agreement, Exhibit P-7, and transcript, testimony of Mary Ethel 
Gregory, page 165-166, page 178, ar.d page 210-211. 
Para 46, page 16. Subject: Whether Parcel 2, with a 
quantity of land slightly less than half an acre, is rendered 
unbuildable. 
This allegation was not established by evidence, 
although the defendants testified as to their belief that the 
lack of quantity made it unbuildable. In fact, the evidence 
indicated that their conclusions were based upon Bradshaw/s 
conclusion that he could not build the house that he planned on 
that property without using part of the Private Drive. 
(Transcript, testimony of McNeil, page 230, lines 4 & 5.) Mr. 
McNeil testified that Parcel 2 was "buildable" (transcript, page 
476), as did Warren Reynolds (transcript, page 252, 264.) 
12 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants7 
Statement of Facts, especially -- but not only — where it 
relies upon the Stipulation, is unreliable. The foregoing was 
not exhaustive. Other statements of fact in appellant's Brief 
suffer from the same problems. 
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Addendum 2 
Robert M. Taylor, #3208 
John S. Adams, #A0017 
TAYLOR, ENNENGA, ADAMS & LOWE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 263-1112 
FILEB oianraicr CQIBHT 
Th»CI JUUICUAI OMtfiOt 
D£££3 
oy« .^-ussS^lL; ^ ^ 
3&>dty Clerk 
I M A & W E W <*•:*< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
ALLEN R. GRAHN and JOSEPHINE 
M. GRAHN, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for 
and on behalf of the MARITAL 
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE 
ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, 
and DEAN BRADSHAW and CHRISTI 
BRADSHAW, his wife, and 
SCOTT McNEIL, an individual 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. C-86-8833 
Judge: John A. Rokich 
-oooOooo-
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable 
Judge John A. Rokich on September 24, 1987. The Plaintiffs were 
present, represented by Robert M. Taylor and John S. Adams. 
Defendant Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and on behalf of the 
Marital and Family Trusts of the Albert Eccles Family Trust, 
hereinafter referred to as "Trustee" was present, represented by 
\, ^^ 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury. Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christi 
Bradshaw, his wife, were present, represented by Russell S. 
Walker. Defendant Scott McNeil was present, represented by his 
counsel Allen Sims. 
The Court being fully advised in the premises and 
having rendered its oral decision and two written Memorandum 
decisions and having made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing therefor: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Reformation of the deed delivered by the Defendant 
Trustee to Plaintiffs is hereby ordered to include the Private 
Road. Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay to Trustee the sum of 
Twelve Thousand Six Hundred Four and 04/100 ($12,604.04) Dollars 
for the property in Parcel One, after reformation, in excess of 
1.11 acres. 1/Interest thereon, at /O % per annum, simple 
interest, shall commence on > r ^ /-/f&£» fs/i-ri / £r*/* e/o ^ucrt,'* 
2. It is hereby ordered that said reformed deed shall 
acknowledge that the fifteen foot aesthetic and geologic easement 
shall remain as agreed in the surviving provisions of the March 
18, 1986 Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement, 
which easement, runs along the southeasterly side of the Private 
Road. 
2 
3. The sales transaction between Defendant Trustee 
a:i id Defendai 1 t: Bradshaw s :i = hereby resci nded and,,, except for the 
reformation referred to 1: lereinabove, the parties shal ] be p,3 a :::ed 
in the same positi on as before the Bradshaw transaction. 
4. T* i 'T ] that Bradshaws'claims against 
Plaintiffs are .; , ^missed entirety for no cause of 
action, 
5. J * Ldims 
against Defendar«t McNeil art uisr^Sbcd no cau^e act, -n 
6. It - .• • • « i , .* i e r r i t • - " ' • ^  t e ? i n t 
Tin i s t e e s : ] a iii mi = 'be 
pursued separat . 1 ui * UIUJ a c i i jn a; a s 
s t i p u l a t e d be tween Defendan t ^ and r ^ f e n d a n t y ' : . 
7 . 1 
t h e p a r t i e s b u t dues d^d iu o u s t s t u P l a i n t i f f s a g a i n s t 
t h e d e f e n d a n t s e x c e p t McNei l H u n d r e d 
F i f t-i I-' i 
b e a r t h e i r ow it i c o s t s ai id f e e s . 
DATED t h i s o?«J^ day of (^^^ f **?•$-*y^' , 11 98 S^T" 
B1!: f THE ^™ ' " *n ": 
Honfcrable JcYr * ^ o k i c h 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this -ZO dav of 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq. 
2 677 East Parleys Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Allen Sims, Esq. 
#8 East Broadway, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell S. Walker, Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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Addendum 3 
Fn - - , ' • • - O F F I C E 
v Utah 
DEP '' 1988 
\ ^ DEPUTE CLERK 
IN AND FOR SALT 'LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A L L E N R# QRAHN and. JOSEPHINE : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
M. GRAHN, husband and wife, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
'3 a 2 i I t :. i ffs, "L'l IL llu. O-Bti Of • I 
HEROLD GREGORY, Trustee, for 
and on behalf of the MARITAL i 
AND FAMILY TRUSTS OF THE ALBERT 
ECCLES FAMILY TRUST, and DEAN : 
BRADSHAW and CHRISTI BRADSHAW 
his wife, and SCOTT McNEIL. I 
an individual, 
Def endar I ts. 
This natter came :- t^fore the Honcra> 
Roki 'i :: h :: i i September 2 1 
represented by Robert . yi-.r *- John S Adams. Defendant 
Herold L. Gregory, Trustee, and c i i behalf of the Marital and 
Fail! :1 ] i T r i is ; I: ? : f t::l i, = I ] Il : i .3 : t Ec: .c •] e s I c ;ITIII ::i ] j T11 : m 1 5 t : I: 1 = 
referred to as "trustee11 was present, and represented by Jeffrey 
I I Woodburi Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Christ! Bradshaw., his 
i i :i f€ ; i 1= J : • = present and represent : :i b} Ill isse] Il S W11 kr v 
Defendant Scott McNeil was present, and i: epresented by 111 s 
counsel Allen Sims, 
T h e Cox 11: t h e a n I 1.1 M " L1" 11 1 IIK H ly Il 1 I i i e ^ s e s , 1 Jim 11 I e d 
documentary evidence, viewed the property which was the subject 
GRAHN V. GREGORY PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
matter of this litigation, read the Memoranda on file herein, 
heard oral arguments, and then took the matter under advisement 
pending the receipt of supplemental Memoranda. The Court 
received the supplemental Memoranda, reviewed the file, its 
notes, the Memoranda on file and the documentary evidence. 
The Court made inquiries from time to time as to the status 
of this matter. The Court was advised that the parties were 
attempting to negotiate a settlement. The Court finally called 
plaintiffs1 counsel and requested that this matter be noticed up 
for hearing and that their clients be present. The hearing was 
not held because of the illness of one of the attorneys. The 
Court was advised that the parties could not enter into a 
settlement agreement, nor agree upon Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The Court advised counsel it could prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law so that this case can be 
concluded at least on the District Court level and the parties 
can take whatever action they deem appropriate. 
The Court held a hearing on November 10, 1988 for the 
purpose of reviewing the status of this case with counsel and 
their clients. The Court explained to counsel and the litigants 
that the Court is not the reason for the delay in the resolution 
of this case. The delay is the result of settlement negotiations 
and the parties being unable to agree upon the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Since the parties could not agree, the 
r> *• r\ > • r, -A 
GRAHN V. GREGORY PAGE THREE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
i i i n mi I , 1 1 1 1 HI i 1 I i i MI in 1 1 1 1 I  i . 1 1 i i i i ( ' i i a n MI I |' I in i n i , | i ii H | , 1 1 ! I i n II in mi ini I  
Conclusions c: f I .a w :I i i accordance with ts Memorandum Decision. 
The Court mitt^d it* Findings of !\K t and Conclusions of 1 .aw 
II I'lll I l l '' I 
Findings c: , * * onclusions of Law, The ,:cur *. notice 
of; the Dbjprtio^*" --»-* fied m correctc - • ^ *  
I I i n I i in i i p l i 1 . ' I 
L a w . 
The Court now being fi i] 3 y advised i n the premises and havi ng 
rendered i ts on a II decisi oi i ai id two \ /r it ten Memorandum Decisions, 
now makes the following final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 V :*.* ': t: " : '•• • '" • » r 6 : c • =!!!;]| < "I" i II II111 1 I lil l l l i f J S T"P S 11 I \ P I I II' «, 
of Sa ] ua^u County, State , ,i J tal :i 
2 Tl le defendant Marital and Fami ly Trusts of the Albert 
Eccles Faroi 1 ;  r Ti: i ist, Hc= r o] I I G] :iegor} T::i :ustee , 
cer t:a :l i 1 :;i : ., .] proper I:/; ] ocated a I : approximate! 
Brookburn Road, Salt Lake City, Sail t I ,ake County, SI > :- Utah. 
3 Defendants Dean Bradshaw and Chi: :i sti ' -
:i i n :3 i s :I du a 1 s i e s i d i n j :i i , s • i 111 II: La ke C o n :i 11y S t a t e o f Ut ah. 
1 Defendant , Scott McNel 1 i s an i ndividual i ; .siding 
Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
GRAHN V. GRAHAM PAGE FOUR FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
5. The real property owned by the defendant trusts was 
listed for sale. The real property listed, after negotiation for 
the sale and purchase thereof was divided into two parcels. At 
the time of trial the Court designated for identification 
purposes the two parcels as Parcel One and Parcel Two. 
6. Trustee represented to the plaintiffs that the 
southeasterly edge of the road was the boundary between Parcel 
One and Parcel Two, and that a 15 foot aesthetic easement along 
the southeasterly edge of the private road was to be included if 
and when trustee sold Parcel Two. 
7. The private road provided ingress and egress to Parcel 
One. 
8. Trustee did engage defendant McNeil to survey a one-
half acre lot on the southeasterly side of the private roadway 
for a building lot for Barbara Danielson. The Court designated 
said lot as Parcel Two. 
9. Plaintiffs and trustee entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for Parcel One (including 
the private road) on March 18, 1986, which transaction was closed 
on August 1, 198 6. 
10. Defendants Bradshaws and trustee entered into an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement for the 
purchase of Parcel Two. The legal description used for Parcel 
Two had been prepared by defendant McNeil. 
GRAt: •• -r ' i-AGI'", I1"!"1"'1!!1 I-'TIII >1 lir,/-i ," f'.'iNPLURION.S 
i, -xiie Tn^-r-f-'t. M o n e y A g r e e m e n t e n t e r e d i n t o b y d e f e n d a n t s 
Bradshaws ar. . ee p:i : o v I cf :l in11 n I aaja, I li il 
plaintiffs Grahns had first rig.' refusa. to purchase Parcel 
Two. 
TO rpri1cr+:oo thereafter offered plaint iJ 1 a a t it: a I i 111 I 11 nl 
refusa, t*
 t urchase Parcel Two which was not exercised by 
descr- it I: :: Parcel One was o; \ a 
plaintiffs :- -,!-- *r-n the Salt Lake County Recorders Office nhe 
reel ( • • ' due md 
accepted , - « .,i id defendants -J; a;.- a c r e a ^ be 
so ld and purchased* 
' ^ 1 III I I 
southeasterly edge of the road • ^.w/iuary ami the 
technical description did not conforr eat mil the 
• \JLH^ vjjrtuji, .Jy including the road :i i 1 Parcel One 
receive - -1 V C P S S , i zrr-^ j cf ; in'-
« p-cutr- - Earnest 
Mone^ :lece:, • ..: . > .urchas, ^greeme: 
they did n^t ;-, i .a, survey an describing the boundaries, 
but .lie southeasterly side of the 
private roadway. 
GRAHN V. GREGORY PAGE SIX FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
17. The defendants Bradshaw did rely upon the reference 
made by defendant McNeil that Parcel Two contained .5 acres. 
18. The defendants Bradshaw needed .5 acres in order to 
obtain a building permit from the Salt Lake County Planning 
Commission. 
19. If Parcel Two did not contain .5 acres, defendant 
Bradshaws could terminate the agreement and trustee refund the 
purchase price. 
20. Prior to defendants Bradshaws closing on the purchase 
of Parcel Two, trustee discovered that the McNeil survey was in 
error and the remapping of the survey of Parcel Two by defendant 
McNeil showed that a portion of the private road was contained in 
Parcel Two. 
21. Defendants Bradshaw did not have an enforceable 
agreement with Rocky Mountain Refractories. 
22. The legal description contemplated to be used for 
Parcel Two was in error and did not conform with the intent of 
the parties, that Parcel Two has located on the southeasterly 
edge of the private road. 
23. Plaintiffs did not rely upon defendant McNeil's survey 
of Parcel Two and were owed no duty by defendant McNeil. 
24. The Court makes no finding as to the trustee's claim 
against McNeil at this time because counsel for trustee and 
GRAHN V GREGORY PAGE SEVEN FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
M c N e I I i n i I 'M I in h i , i i I  1 I i I in I I I i 11 I In in i i n HI I HI i n " i f i I i i I  I  i , 
stipulation between those parties. 
Based upon the foregoi ng Findings of Fact, the Cour t iio'w 
enters the fo] 1 owi ng: ' ' 
CONCLUSIONS OF I AW 
] , Till: , : i = i i be tweei i t:::ii: m is t e e ai I I p i a :i it I tiii :!: f s si l : "i ill i 11 : = 
reformed t: : i nclude the private roadway as Parcel One ai I il, 
plaintiffs shoi il d pay for the excess acreage. 
1 1 a i n t i f f s G r a h i i i 11 i :I I: r u s t e e s t: i p u 1 a t e 11: I a t $ ] 2 , , 6 0 1 0 1 
r e p r e s e n t s a f a i r v a l u e of t h e g round :i u: i € ixc .ess of 1 1 Il a c r e s . 
I i l t e i r e s t sha ] ] 1: s pa:i I :: i i tl ic= $] 2 , 604 . 06 commencing oi I a d a t e 
d e t e r m i n e d , 
••iformed dee* " •* thaJ" 
a g r e e d . ^, ^ . - ,;. \ 
Money I^ce:»' 'urchase Agreement, which casement 
*ivate road. 
:
.i - iiao*,L U.UM.M.U., , *. ^ /»i . ^ *• c 11asei"iJ 11n I 
therefore r ' entitle* r specifically '* "ore- the agreement for 
"' * reformation 
referre.- < , ,c^ t^v ., , ,...i £i.-L- .„ . J«. 
position as before the Bradshaw transaction,, 
GRAHN & GREGORY PAGE EIGHT FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
5. The transaction between trustee and defendants Bradshaw 
should be rescinded. 
6. Bradshaws have no cause of action against plaintiffs 
for the alleged prevention by injunction of the building of their 
home on Parcel Two. 
7. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant 
McNeil for the erroneous first survey completed with respect to 
Parcel Two. 
8. The defendant trustee's claims against defendant McNeil 
may be pursued in separate litigation in a future action as 
provided by stipulation between defendant trustee and defendant 
McNeil. 
9. The Court does not award attorney's fees to any of the 
parties, but does award costs to the plaintiffs against all 
defendants except defendant McNeil. All other parties must bear 
their own costs and fees. 
Dated this <~^^ day of December, 1988. 
/I jifl^ ,4 
JOHN" A. ROKICH 
R^ICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTt-
o%#'jty Gteifc 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
.-.^  - Tiie and correct copy of 
rvl Conclusions of Law, postage 
„_-:'_'_ of DoceiTll or 'Il 9 H I I i: 
Robert 1 1. Taylor 
John S. Adams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5525 South 900 East, Suite .J 
Salt Lake Ci ty, Utah 84] ?. 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury, Esq. 
2677 E. Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Allen Sims, Esq. 
#8 E. Broadway, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ru s s e 11 S . W a 1 k e i: , E s q, 
50 S. Main, Suite 2 000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 4 4 
ereLv CL.rt, ; . 
the foregoina Findings 
i v i &- L ^< 
Addendum 4 
, . l • e (• I I I' > { 0 ) 
• • > : . , • ^ U k ' i v T - ' . S 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT- — 
- : • " : : - • : • ^ ^ : ' : * ? / / ! A K t h . i f j : : f ? ^ , • •*. -.^ -
Allen R. Grahn and Josephine^ M/G^ - - r^ -r>; ••*• ••-••<•
 ft •-^ 
The undesigned Buyrjr '•' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _». . 1 hereby deposits with Brokerarji 
Five hundred and QQ/100 omiars f$5D.Q.-.00 ) 
form o« P e r s o n a l C h e c k t O b e d e p o s i t e d U p o n wh.ch shall tierJepos^od m accordance wit^aDpl.caJ^Stntu L;iw 
Recoived by 
acceptance 
>t.„.applicable: submitted by Buyer 
'.«rnfjft ' A Phono Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
/tl>**« & wCr^ 'rn^yj ^ I /*<*&$-. 
I PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 1he above stated EARNEST MONEY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at 2811 
1st Brookburn . in the City of S a l t Lake . County of . Sa l t Lake Utah 
>ec.\ to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way. government patents or state deeds of record approved by Guy 
r.c.oHlnnre with Section G. Said property is more particularly described as: T h e 1 * 1 1 a c r e p r o p e r t y a C C O r d i n Q t O t j l _ e 
?gal de . sc r ip t ian^ j i_£h&3^ 
CHECK APPLICABLE BOXES" ' r e f e r e n c e . 
3 UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY 0 Vacant Lot Q Vacant Acreage Q Other . 
X IMPROVED RFAL PROPERTY Q Commercial 52 Residential § Condo O Other 
I, 1 1 in c I u d e cl i 1. e ms. U1 f es s ex c: I u d e d 1) e lo w, this sa le s 11 nl I inc lude a i I f i 11 u re s a n d a 1 1 y o I t h e t t em $ sh 0 wn in Se c t i o ft A i f p m se nil y a 11 ac h ed to the p r o pe r t», 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: f i r e p l a c e 
„ins.£r.t in pir k room, electric range _ 1 
(b) £*cluded items. "1 i« following items are specifically excluded from this «»u-"a 1 1 items n o t S p e c i f i c a l l y i n c l u d e d 
i l t f O'-lfL"" I f I 
.under... (a) ...abc v.a..are_excJLude.d_.fr.onLJ;his_s^LLe. 
• • » CONNECTIONS. UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS Sollr.-r represents that the property includes the h.-!!o\vu;<j .inpn.-.tinonts 
,-^ ;». hi..-s»'.v. r o* ,,rM"' li QVVUII ©connected 6'other j<|«..'loi:tMC«ty Xcirmetted 
O-'-P'"- tiint- O 'v tnxtv J xJ<mg(ition water/secondary system ^ingress & egress by private nnse^ienj 
O other s.mmify system ... •=• of shares ,', 2 Company N p f f ! S
 v Xdedicated road Xpaved 
Kfjubhe .vater jfconrieoKl OTV antenna ©master antenna '5 .«v.^M ' gcurb and gutter 
Opnvatc water fOccnner ed Rnatural gas Qconnectcd 5 other rights 
prior to closing. Dshall not be furnishe (d) Survey. A certified survey Cfehafl be furnished at the expense of 
(el Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physic 
condition, fti^pi- n o p v r p p j - i n n . g . H o w e v e r
 f offer is expressly conditioned upon an 
Inspect-ion hy FUiyer wif-hin t en MO) d a y s p r i o r t o c l o s i n g t o conf i rm no sub-— 
: J which shall be paid as follow; 
^existing survey acceptable stantial change or loss has occur* 
2. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING, The total purchase price tor the property .c T w o h u n d r e d , f i f t e e n t h o u s a n d a n d 
V l f l f l > W H W T f - > w w - W H p l . r , W H - n n > - ^ r H f f f f - Dollars {$ 2 * 5 - / 0 D O r f l f t 1-1'% > 
S O P , 0 0 which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: %\5 j 7 "? %' SO' ^ 
:Q% BilQrrQQj representing the approximate balance, of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing, 
represent ng the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate com tract or other ei icui nbrai ice to bt: assunti 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly pai n iei its of $ . 
* •'• "*:h include: 0 principal* G interest* Otax.es: Hinsurance: Dcondo fees; Oother . - « _ - - _ _ _ 
U 0 
representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed i w:;ite, real estate c.o^r 
:tsii mo i l t>y Buv^r w h i r h uh l i { | i i f iun Iw.i 'S intnrest at ....— "• (I'^r r i iu i i in i w i t h m o n t h l y p. iv- > ' ' • ••' 




' " ' - ••*;'-'»« «ui hat.in... x'XMX'KX'K'MN.'M'X'X K A K ' X ^ K X X X X X X X X X X'XK Ul h"1" I , ; M ' 1 l" 
.iot -applicable- . -
Mot applicable _.. _ ._. 
.no.t_&i2iLUj£a b.±£L 
,lbi"; :es to 
3 7l2>sdrkt~-xlot Applicable 
Jb4-iOOOV4y^'TAL PURCHASE PRICE 
\ Buyer is required to assume an underlying obligation and ••""Of obtain outside financing. Buyei agrees to use best efforts to assume and /or procure same and th 
is made subject, to Buyer qualifying for and lending insiitt ttion grantirfg said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application within . 
alter Seller s acceptance of this Agreement, to assume the underlying kblig 
iyer docs not qualify for the issumption and/or financing withi 
e option of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice 
ieller agrees to pay % . 
' th<$ Agreement involves the.assumption of 
rfcinc 
on and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed _ '" 
tf/s after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, mis Agreement shall be vo^iab 
towards Buyer's total finan g anp closing costs, including, but not limited to. loan discount points 
 t  ti  f an existing foah-br,obligation on the property! Section F shall apply. . • ' . * ~ . / " ; ^ H ^ p : 
EARNESTMONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property: plumbing, 
iting, air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies 
J rods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets*, water softener, automatic garage door 
jner and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs. 
B INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer s own'examination and judgment and not by 
son of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income 
efrom or as to its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires 
f additional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer 
C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which 
> not or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, hens or other encumbrances 
any nature shall be brought current on or before closing; end (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
ill be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing. 
0. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers' knowledge, provided on adequate supply of 
ter and continued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and 
ler has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards 
F. ACCELERATION CLAUSE. No later th8n fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. 
Her shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the 
isent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire ba'ance due in the 
»nt of sale If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three-(3) days after notice of 
nwaiver or disapproval or on the date of closing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice 
Seller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void 
G TITLE INSPECTION* No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. Buyer 
ill have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney s opinion, or a preliminary title report on the subject property 
yer shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine end accept. If Buyer does not accept. Buyer shall give wntten notice thereof to Seller 
Seller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the 
fect(s) to which Buyer has objected If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option 
the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
H TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALTA 
licy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than 
>se provided for in said standard form and the encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot he made so insurable through 
escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement 
all thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge 
I EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) days 
er Seller's acceptance of this Agreement but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, a .copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting 
I property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereolter. Buyer sha'l take title subject to such 
ises If objection is not remedied withm the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void 
J CHANGES OURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement. Sellc agrees i'iat no changes »n any existing 'eases '•-ail be made nor 
w leases e'ntered into nor shall any s u ^ ' intial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the .vnMen consent of tiu. Buvsr 
,GE ONE OF A FOUR PAGE FORM 
CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller Q.holds title to the property in fee simple D is purchasing the property'under 
esta^sqntract. Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the 
ty, subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by D!Da\CUCrentriQlicyLQf .tillejin^uranee in ihe amount of purchase price Qar r abstract 
•btoughhtvuCT>trvvitH-ef>-ettc<ne.yXopi^ioM^^Sex^iQxiJH). SCc? CAhib*'? A < ' * ' '<?. A ' . (' <? 
INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance ,,with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing. 
^hallMak&li l taJ&UbjeClla.^ not. reviewed any condo* 
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest'lrtBuyer as follows: M i e n R . P r n l i n ' ^ i P -~T " n n c ; " - 1 ^ P ' ' , ' " : ? - - v - y j — j
 r , +- > ^ . — 
^ n i t i / f ^ o r t.r-?n*nri PS' 'r^  Vrf>rf>:d n f M o s i n r , _ 
, SELLER WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: J l l l l ; — 1 •. \'—^r: >*«-?>,-• ;-;r>y 
^eunder i s l c a a l l - v d i v i d e d and s e p a r a t e fror? thn s^ioiv\Uv 1 - t i j «-.••<•,-^  • ,v' ; ; 0 n r : . r 
rffnCfltattv^^ * boning r e c o r d s . __ 
• " ' . ' • " • • • ' ^ "
 : 
.SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES."' This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must 
isfied priofto'closing; --fa*. ?-:* V i ^ l f- 7* ": t 
CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on ™ hainr* 'fttrrrrfc«+- T 1_ ,"19 J2-6 at a reasonable location to be designated by 
, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
his Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R, shall be-made as of QC&alB7ofepos$ess!pp:Q,jdaie"of closing n-other- _ _ . . 
i POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on , l"V, f j , ^ £ ? t 1
 im 1 ./ o unless extended by written agreement of parties. 
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS, 1 Inless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporaieu uuu una 
ment by reference " * * 
, AGREEMENT T6 PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
lave until <<l*'y ' '-K. (AM/ftvjJ), />)r.*. k~Hc$s<P , 1 9 .1? Q . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shalL return the 
- / / / A / 1 ' ft^?.<^/^l: /!-*>. •;< .-,*X-? 5- / - 9£ 
J • I KT7T - ^Z" /jt r> r 
EST MONEY to the Buyer. 
ture of Buyer \ ~' ~ / ^ Date gnature^'f Buyer Date 
'.'•.' • . i • •' • - . • ' , „ „ ' • I, ' ; i 7 K 
K ONE 
2EPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer-on the terms and conditions specified above. . 
JECJJON. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer. _ _ _ _ (Seller's.Initials) 
(JNTER OFFER.'Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer SUBJECTTO.theiexceptiona or inodificotions as*specified below or m the tmached AddericJum, and 
sents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's-acceptance. Buyer shall have, until r -,„ ^-.—... (A.M > P.M.) . _ „ _ .—. , 19 _ to accept the terms 
cified below. 
. (AM-PM) 
Signature of Seller . Signature of Seller 
X ONE: < '"• . • • • • • •• ' • 
yer accepts the counter offer 
yer accepts with modifications on attached addendum *' ' 
/ A M pMi Signature of Buyer * Signature of Buyer 
3MMISSION. The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to: (^~~y / ~7y% ••/ • , z ~ ~ r. ' ; •• < V / . ^ - r — — - • (Brokerage) 
f i s s i o n of ^T/^ / r ;- r *
 % \ t j • ,, / v -^  - - t / ; , - •« consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer. 
t^/Y//y^Mx^^i. - 5-/j~f6> ' 
iture of Seller / - & Date Signature of Seller Date 
. i * • ' • i , ' i • " i ' ' — 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
tate Law requires Broker !o furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. {One of the followii lg alteri iatt\ es i i ist t 
>mpleted). 
. P I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: • 
ATURE OP SELLER '•' ^ ^ SIGNATURE OF BUYER 
/ __ Date ( ,^ , .. • , „ ,, //*"<) Date 
Date " / Date 
.' D l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on , 1 9 by 
fied Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the D Seller • Buyer Sent by 
i fhi!!..., .if » fin,r pnrjf» »MMTI Seller's Initials ( > <'. y(<- ) ^Oatft / • Buyer's Initials ( . ' - . ) < . . • ' ' ) . . Date " / •/ 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORY Ouyc or Sellei »<• ,i cnrpor«ition o<» tn« rslwn tusi m« i| «i ,
 u u c ,, <• i*c if h \ ( , i inn , [ ,h 
half \,i rarts his or her M thor t, »o o H d to bind Buyer or Scllc 
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGRCEMCMS This instrument constitutes tho trt.ii* Asi» >mr tt b ( U n n the pam**, fine4 supersedes jrv 
ncel, iy nnd all prior negotiations repn <-ontations warran*ies unnerstandings or agreements between tin ptiiii ^ ** er^ &n no verbal a<reemr->ts which modify 
affcrt this agroomerit This Agreement cmnot be changed except by mutual wntten agreement of thr part.es 
M COUNTER OFFER,S Any count»»r offer made bY Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and* .f «ittached hereto shall m<orpo««»u« oil the provisions *J this 
Irr* -\rn\ not expressly modified or exel iclod therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.* In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the Ernest money as liquidated 
mages or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the ponsatis'actlon of any 
press condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue4jof any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
all be returned to Buyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained th* defaulting party shall 
y all costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any 
medy provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest 
3ney deposit is required to file an interpleader action In court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein the Buyer and Seller 
thorize the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the 'nterpleader action The amount 
deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Bxiyrit and Seller further agree that ihedefau'ting 
rty shall paylhe.court coats am!* reasonable attorney's fefcymcurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
0 ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract, if any,^shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property 
tween the date hereof and the date cf closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
i percent (10%) of the purchase pnee of the property, Buyer may, at his option either proceed with this transacticn if Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
place damaged property prior to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10/o) of the purchase price 
d Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provicledtherein due to interruption of transport 
ikes, fire, flood extreme weather governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller then the closing date shall 
extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter 
ne is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date "Closing' shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed 
d delivered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 / 2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs 
providing title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance if acceptable to the Buyer 
nts, and interest on assumed obligations shallibe prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves 
all be assigned to Buyer at closing 
S REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
ose excepted herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract Seller may transfer by either (a) special 
irranty deed, containing Seller s assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
id existing real estate contract therein 
T AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller 
U BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term 'Brokerage shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
V DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
AGE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION 
EXHIBIT A 
T h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l s e r v e a s an a d d e n d u m s t a t i n g 
a d d i t i o n a l t e r m s o f t h a t o f f e r t o p u r c h a s e i n t h e a t t a c h e d 
E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t d a t e d fiarcfy / & , 1 9 8 6 , 
o f f e r e d by A l l e n R. Grahn and J o s e p h i n e M. G r a h n , i d e n t i f i e d 
t h e r e i n a s Buyer . ( I t i s t h e s e c o n d s u c h a t t a c h m e n t . Tha t 
p r e v i o u s E x h i b i t i s s u p e r s e d e d h e r e b y and s h a l l h a v e no 
f u r t h e r f o r c e or e f f e c t . The a t t a c h e d A g r e e m e n t , w i t h t h i s 
E x h i b i t , s h a l l , form t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s ; 
i t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d by B u y e r t h a t t h e o f f e r e x p i r a t i o n 
d a t e was e x t e n d e d , and t h a t t h i s E x h i b i t r e f l e c t s n e g o t i a t e d 
a m e n d m e n t s t o B u y e r ' s o f f e r . ) The t e r m s h e r e o f a r e h e r e b y 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t , a s i f m o r e f u l l y _ s e t 
f o r t h t h e r e i n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t a n y of t h e t e r m s h e r e o f 
a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t e r m s of t h e s a i d A g r e e m e n t , t h e 
t e r m s of t h i s E x h i b i t s h a l l c o n t r o l . O t h e r w i s e , a l l o t h e r 
t e r m s of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t s h a l l 
r e m a i n t h e s ame . 
A. W i t h r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h 1 ( c ) , i t i s 
u n d e r s t o o d and a g r e e d t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t e n d t h a t B u y e r s 1 
i n s p e c t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y i s s o l e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e of 
d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y h a s n o t b e e n s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
harmed or o t h e r w i s e l o s t v a l u e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g due t o such 
t h i n g s a s , by way of e x a m p l e , w i t h o u t l i m i t a t i o n i n t e n d e d , 
v a n d a l i s m , f i r e , a c t s of God , o r o t h e r c a u s e s f o r w h i c h 
S e l l e r a s s u m e s t h e r i s k . 
B. The b a l a n c e of $ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 w h i c h i s r e f e r r e d 
in PARAGRAPH 2 of t h e a t t a c h e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s A g r e e m e n t 
s h a l l b e p a i d a s f o l i o v; s : s u b j e c t t o t h e t e r m s a n d 
c o n d i t i o n s of a s t a n d a r d l o n g form T r u s t Deed and T r u s t Deed 
N o t e p r o v i d i n g f o r i n t e r e s t a t t h e r a t e of 9% p e r annum on 
t h e p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e , and p a y m e n t s of i n t e r e s t o n l y on a 
m o n t h l y b a s i s i n t h e a m o u n t o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 8 6 3 . 0 0 p e r 
m o n t h , and a b a l l o o n p a y m e n t of t h e t o t a l amoun t due p a y a b l e 
on o r b e f o r e t h e f i f t h a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e of t h e d a t e of 
c l o s i n g , and f u r t h e r p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e s a i d a m o u n t may be 
p a i d a t any t i m e p r i o r t o c l o s i n g w i t h o u t p r e p a y m e n t p e n a l t y 
o f a n y s o r t . In a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o , an a d d e n d u m s h a l l b e 
p l a c e d w i t h t h e U t a h l o n g f o r m T r u s t Deed t o p r o v i d e a s 
f o l l o w s : 
No s a l e of t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h i s t h e s u b j e c t of 
t h i s T r u s t Deed, or any p a r t t h e r o f , s h a l l be p e r m i t t e d 
u n t i l t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s s e c u r e d by t h i s T r u s t Deed i s 
r e p a i d in f u l l , a n d , in t h e e v e n t of s u c h a s a l e p r i o r 
t o s u c h r e p a y m e n t i n f u l l , t h e o b l i g a t i o n s e c u r e d 
h e r e b y s h a l l be i n d e f a u l t and t h e e n t i r e p r i n c i p a l 
b a l a n c e and i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n s h a l l become i m m e d i a t e l y 
1 
due and payable, at the option of the beneficiary of 
this Trust Deed, which option shall be exercised within 
forty-five (45) days of notice of the said sale to the 
said beneficiary. 
C. As referred to in PARAGRAPH 7 of the attached 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the offer is specifically 
subject to the following special conditions and/or 
contingencies•which must be satisfied prior to closing: 
i. This offer is subject to Buyers selling 
and closing on the sale of their home located at 3735 
Emigration Canyon prior to the closing on the sale 
which is the subject of this Agreement, Provided, 
however, that the Seller may continue to offer the 
property described herein for sale and to consider 
offers to purchase the same, subject to Buyers1 first 
right of refusal. Should Seller receive an offer 
against the property which Seller desires to accept, 
then Seller shall have the duty to give notice thereof 
to Buyer, which notice shall be accompanied by a copy 
of the offer and/or other acceptable proof that a 
bona fide written offer has been received by the 
Seller. Seller shall represent, in c o n n e c t i o n 
therewith, that Seller desires to accept the said 
offer, subject to Buyers1 first right of refusal. Prom 
•the date of receipt of said notice, Buyer shall have 
seven (7) days within which to give notice to the 
Seller, in writing,' of Buyers' waiver of the aforesaid 
condition that Buyers1 home be sold and closed prior: to 
closing on Buyers' purchase hereunder. Thereupon, \the 
said offer of which Seller gave Buyer notice shall 
fail, and Buyer and Seller shall close the sale called 
for in this Agreement within sixty (60) days of ..the 
date of the said notice at a reasonable location 
designated by the Seller. The said sale shall t&ke 
place pursuant to and under the terms and conditions 
set forth in this offer, except that the interest 
payments called for under the Trust Deed Note shall not 
commence for a period less than forty-five (45) days 
from the date of closing. Should Buyer fail to remove 
the. said contingency regarding the sale of Buyers1 home 
in Emigration Canyon, then this Agreement shall fail 
for failure to satisfy this contingency and the earnest 
m o n e y deposit made by Buyers hereunder shall be 
refunded, in full. 
i i • This offer is further conditioned upon 
the subject property being free of u n r e a s o n a b l y 
restrictive easements or rights of way in favor of 
others. Buyer shall be delivered the policy of title 
insurance, or the preliminary report thereto, at least 
five days prior to scheduled closing; and Buyer shall 
notify Seller prior to closinq of any burdens which 
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exist which cause this condition not to be satisfied, 
closing shall be postponed, and Seller shall have ten 
days from receipt of such notice to satisfy the subject 
condition by removal of the burden(s) or other 
adjustment acceptable to Buyer. 
D. In addition to the foregoing, tfte following 
conditions and terms are set forth herein as part of the 
consideration for the attached Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, of which this Exhibit is a part. 
With respect to the one-half acre lot adjoining 
the lot which is the subject of this Agreement, Seller 
hereby grants to Buyer the first option to purchase the said 
half acre lot. Seller agrees that, should Seller receive an 
offer from any third party to purchase the said adjoining 
half acre lot, Which Seller desires to accept, Seller shall 
give notice of that desire, in writing, to the Buyer, along 
with a copy of the said offer and, if required by Buyer, 
other proof that Seller has receiveda bona fide offer to 
purchase the said property. The said,notice shall indicate 
and/or be deemed, pursuant to this Agreement, to be an offer 
by Seller to sell the property to Buyer under the same terms 
and conditions as those set forth in the said written offer, 
attached to the notice. Buyer shall have seven (7) days 
within which to accept the said offer by giving Seller 
written notice of Buyers1 desire to purchase under the said 
terms and conditions\ Should Buyer fail to' exercise Buyers1 
opt ion under th is pr& vision, then Seller shall have the 
right to sell the property within ninety (90) days of the 
date of the expiration of Sellers* said option on terms and 
conditions no more favorable than those originally offered 
under this paragraph to Buyer. Should the offer be amended 
making the terms more favorable, or should the said offer 
fail and a new offer be received, then the said amendment or 
offer shall be, once again, subject to the terms of this 
provision. The terms of this prov i s ion shall survive the 
closing of the purchase of the property which is the subject' 
of the main Agreement. _ , 
emph. 
supplied 
S h o u l d S e l l e r s e l l t h e a d j o i n i n g o n e - h a l f 
a c r e l o t t o a n y t h i r d p a r t y a f t e r B u y e r s ' f a i l u r e t o 
p u r c h a s e t h e s a m e u n d e r t h e t e r m s o f t h e n e x t 
p r o c e e d i n g p a r a g r a p h , S e l l e r f u r t h e r a g r e e s h e r e b y t o 
g r a n t on c a s e m e n t and r e s t r i c t i v e c o v e n a n t , in f a v o r of 
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the owners of the land which is the subject: of this 
main agreement, which covenant shall run with the land, 
Jt£ w_ij^ : a requirement that the trees and brush not be 
removed" (Acts of God removing or necessitating removal 
of the same excepted) from the one-half acre lot from 
any point within fifteen (15) feet of the existing 
drive which separates the two lots, it being understood 
that the said trees and brush effectively serve as an 
asthetic break between the properties, as well as a 
geologic protection against erosion onto the property 
which is' the subject of the main agreement. Should 
such trees and/or brush be removed as a result of an 
act of God, the owner of the benefitted property shall 




s u p p l i e d 
E. With r e s p e c t t o p a r a g r a p h 3 . of t h e a t t a c h e d , 
i t i s a g r e e d t h a t S e l l e r s h a l l e v i d e n c e t h e t i t l e to t h e 
p r o p e r t y ( p r o v i d e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h a t 
s e c t i o n , among o t h e r s ) by a c u r r e n t p o l i c y of t i t l e 
i n su rance in the amount of the purchase p r i c e , and not by-an 
a b s t r a c t . See, a l s o Genera l P r o v i s i o n II. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Buyers and S e l l e r s hereby 
a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i r a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g i s *an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d E a r n e s t Money S a l e s 
Agreement which has a l s o been f u l l y execu ted by the p a r t i e s . 
oJJUsn /2- <3/7^~As^i^ 
Buyer Dated: 3 V -S6 //Buy^r Dated: "3-/-j>G 
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ECCLES, CAROLINE T (TR) 
2811 E BROOKBURN RD 
SLC, UT 84109 
Property descr ip t ion and loca t ion : 
BEG 25 RDS S & 9'*2 FT E FR NV COR SEC 55 T IS 
R IE SL MER E 5-58 FT S 220 FT M OR L TO CEN OF 
MILL CREEK E'LY & SE'LY ALG SD CREEK 89 .22 FTtf 
S 6 4 . 6 FT; S'LY ALG CURVE TO R 5 8 . 4 5 FT; 
S 28°15'29" W 4 9 . 5 5 FT; SW'LY ALG CURVE TO R 
88 .015 FT; S 8 4 . 7 7 FT; W 1 0 2 . 1 2 5 FT; N 555 FT M 
OR L TO CEN OF HILL CREEK; SE'LY ALG SD CEN LINE 
TO A PT S FR BEG; N 220 FT M OR L TO BEG. 1 .11 AC 5576-82 
Addendum 5 
EXHIBIT B 
3215 Skycrest Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
21 November 1986 
Mr. and Mrs. Allen Grahn 
3735 emigration Canyon 
oalt Lake Jity, UT 84108 
Dear Allen and Josephine: 
We need to call your attention to a mutual • 
mistake in connection with the property located at 
2811 Brookburn Koad which you are in the process of 
acquiring from us. 
As you know, the total property consisted of 
two different parcels. Based upon a previous survey, 
we presumed that the driveway to the larger (one acre) 
piece was the boundary. In fact, however, the new 
survey shows that the lane is mostly on the one-half 
acre piece. The error was in locating the driveway. 
nothing is changed in the legal descriptions. 
You still have the same amount of property that was 
deeded to you. However, the buyer of the one-half 
acre piece needs to have your driveway moved so that 
he can proceed with the construction of his home. 
There appear to be two alternatives: 
1) We can move the driveway for you. 
2) We will have to refund your money and take 
back the property. 
What would you like to do to resolve this 
situation? 
We are very sorry this happened, and we hope 




THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into on this 20th day 
of November, 1986 by and between Herold L. Gregory, as Trustee of 
Albert Eccles Family Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Seller"), 
and Dean Bradshaw (hereinafter referred to as "Buyer"), 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, Seller was at one time the owner of a tract of 
land in East Mill Creek whereon was located the former residence of 
the Albert Eccles family; and 
WHEREAS, a private roadway and driveway serves such 
property originating near,the Southwest corner of the property and 
running East Northeasterly through the property to such former 
residence, and 
WHEREAS, a survey was prepared in 1984 of the subject-
property which purported to locate such driveway and to create 
legal descriptions for the homesite and an additional parcel to the 
Southeast of such drive containing approximately 0.56 acres; and 
WHEREAS, the Southeast parcel hereinafter referred to as 
"building site" was conveyed to a family member for the purpose of 
building a residence but has since been reconveyed to the Seller; 
and 
WHEREAS, the homesite parcel was previously sold in 
accordance with such descriptions to a third party without specific 
reference to the driveway, although the Seller and third party 
buyer may have presumed that the driveway was included within the 
homesite parcel, and such parcel was described in accordance with 
such survey descriptions; and 
WHEREAS, a subsequent survey has determined that the 
former survey was in error in designating the location of the 
driveway; and 
WHEREAS, the building site would contain substantially 
less than 0.56 acres if the descriptions were modified such that 
the driveway was totally within the homesite, and would be more 
difficult for Buyer to construct his home in accordance with plans 
already partially prepared; and 
WHEREAS, Buyer is nonetheless willing to purchase the 
property in accordance with the former survey description 
recognizing that future claims of the homesite purchaser may result 
in reduction of the land area of the building site if it is 
subsequently determined that the homesite description must be 
amended to include the land between the conveyed homesite and the 
Southeasterly side of the existing homesite driveway as presently 
located; and Buyer is willing to assume the risk that the site may 
be reduced in size in accordance with the above, and to indemnify 
Seller from all costs or liabilities that may result from Seller 
conveying to Buyer the property as per the original survey 
description formerly used in conveying same to an Eccles family 
member (Barbara). 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements herein 
contained, it is mutually covenanted and agreed as follows: 
1. Seller shall convey said building site to Buyer 
utilizing the legal description provided in connection with the 
first survey aforementioned purporting to contain approximately 
0.56 acres. 
2. Notwithstanding any warranties or covenants contained 
in said conveyance, it is mutually agreed that Seller is conveying 
the portion of the parcel lying within the existing driveway as 
well as the portion lying Northwest of the existing driveway by 
quitclaim only, subject to such defenses and claims as may at some 
date arise by virtue of future claims of Allen R. Grahn and 
Josephine M. Grahn,(hereinafter referred to as "Grahn") the 
purchasers of the existing homesite and anyone claiming by, through 
or under them. 
3. Should litigation ensue wherein Grahn claims a right 
to conveyance of the land lying Northwest of the Southeast line of 
existing drive, Buyer agrees, in cooperation with Seller, to 
equally participate in the cost of defending such claim and any 
damages awarded Grahn, if any; and should Grahn be awarded such 
property Buyer agrees to accept title to the remaining portion of 
the property without abatement of the purchase price provided 
necessary governmental approvals are obtainable to permit 
construction and maintenance of a residence on the building site. 
Buyer assumes all risk of gaining all necessary governmental 
approvals for construction whether or not the building site remains 
at approximately 0.56 acres. 
4. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer in reasonable 
efforts to resolve any dispute that may arise over such segment of 
ground which was not at any time conveyed to Grahn, including 
willingness of Seller to relocate such driveway, without expense to 
Buyer should such a program be required in order to resolve any 
potential dispute with Grahn. 
5. In case of default in performing the terms of this 
agreement, the defaulting party shall be responsible for costs 
incurred in enforcing same or any right arising out of the breach 
thereof including reasonable attorneys fees. 
6. It is mutually recognized that this agreement is 
executed as a condition precedent to the willingness of Seller to 
sell and convey the subject property to Buyer, inasmuch as the 
potential discrepancy has been discovered prior to such sale, 
7 73^r-v. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have caused the foregoing agreement 
to be executed on the day and year first above written. 
Albert Eccles Family Trust (Seller) 
Buyer: 
yy ^  y^r 
. - ^ ir'^J>> < > 
Dean Br'adshaw 
